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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Harrison Brewer  
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Poetry and Ecstasy: Thinking Bodily with Heidegger and Bataille 
 
 
This essay explores the possibilities for thinking of the body as a site of exposure to 
and commingling with the world. I begin with Martin Heidegger’s engagement with the 
question of poetry as an encounter with the non-conceptual dimension of experience 
(earth). I then show how the disclosure of this non-conceptual dimension of experience in 
poetry requires an irreducibly bodily form of thought and experience. 
In the second chapter, I turn to the work of Georges Bataille in order to explore the 
bodily experiences and meditative practices he developed in the decades around and 
during World War II. First, I examine his writings concerning eroticism and laughter to 
show how these bodily experiences exceed conceptual determination and explanation. 
Lastly, I look at Bataille’s appropriation of medieval mystic Angela of Foligno’s practice 
of stigmatic meditation as a discipline of bodily exposure. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: I KNOW THAT IS POETRY 
Since I was a teenager, I have memorized my favorite poems. I can’t say precisely 
when or why I began to do this, but it has become an important habit of mine over the 
past decade or so. Some poems lends themselves to it more than others, but I never know 
whether I will be able to memorize a poem until I read it aloud, and I am only able to 
memorize a poem by repeatedly reading increasingly long passages aloud. Audible 
recitation is, for me, inseparable from memorization. At a first glance this is a curious 
habit, a neat parlor trick by which I can entertain myself; indeed, it has often served me 
well in office waiting rooms and in long lines to be able to retreat into the cache of poetry 
I carry with me. Additionally, it is a quite useful skill for an academic, both in writing 
and in conversation.  
 In the memorization and recitation of poems, however, there is another altogether 
different experience, divorced from entertainment and utility. I have never been able to 
name it exactly, but there is a way in which memorizing and reciting a poem allows me to 
sink into it, to feel the timbre, rhythm, and texture of the words as they leave the tongue. 
In this dual process, I can no longer treat line breaks, parentheses, and ellipses as merely 
grammatical or formal concerns; reciting the poem reveals that line breaks, ellipses, and 
parentheticals can make or break a poem, putting it’s visual structure and spoken rhythm 
in play with one another. In short, memorizing and reciting poetry allows me to 
experience the poem as a poem, to give myself over to the shape, color, and texture of the 
words rather than only the interpretation of their meaning. In reading aloud, I never feel 
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in control of the poem, but rather in motion with it, and in certain instances, exposed to it. 
In the latter instance, I realize that I do not know how to recite the poem, and it feels as if 
I have failed to measure up to the words. Whether I feel exposed or exalted, however, I 
often recall the Emily Dickinson quote that a high school English teacher of mine would 
often recite to us:  
If I read a book and it makes my whole body so cold no fire can warm me, 
I know that is poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of my head were 
taken off, I know that is poetry. These are the only ways I know it. Is there 
any other way? (Dickinson).  
Years later, I must confess that I still know no other way. In short, I have come to 
understand memorization and recitation as a practice of reading with my body—with my 
tongue and my throat. This bodily reading reveals another aspect of language than that of 
signification and reference. Indeed, it reveals another aspect of experience than that 
organized by projects and meaning.  
 This essay takes up this experience and tries to pursue this seemingly ephemeral 
dimension. Using the work of Martin Heidegger and Georges Bataille, I hope to offer two 
exemplary moments in which the body’s involvement in experience and thought becomes 
clear and undeniable: poetry and ecstasy. To take these experiences seriously is to accept 
that human experience, indeed human being, is a concrete spatio-temporal occurrence, 
and not the subsumption of sense-data under concepts in the service of knowledge 
production. In poetry and ecstasy, we find ourselves exposed and comingled with the 
world rather than presiding over it or observing and manipulating it from a scientifically 
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objective remove; these experiences refer us to the textural, non-conceptual aspect of 
experience that resists our attempts to control, calculate, and render it useful.  
 Starting with Heidegger’s engagement with the question of the body in the 
Zollikon Seminars, I use Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib to develop a 
thinking of the body as an irreducible aspect of human experience and not an object of 
study or an extension of subjectivity. From there, I examine Heidegger’s turn towards 
poetry in the 1930s and 40s in order to examine the link between his thinking of poetry 
and earth. This brings out this “self-secluding” dimension of being that poetry brings-
forth without breaking-open—the non-disclosive aspect of language and experience that 
does not contribute anything to conceptual knowledge. My contention is that this earthly 
dimension of experience cannot be thought without the body’s involvement.  
 For Heidegger, however, the strife between earth and world does not only 
characterize poetry, but is rather the truth of being as such; the work of poetry is to 
establish a site for encountering this truth. There is an earthly and a worldly dimension to 
all beings, but in our everyday involvements, we cover over the earthly dimension of 
being and see beings as equipment or objects, defined in terms of their relevance and 
utility for the achievement of projects. Further, we lose sight of the active, verbal 
dimension of being and see only these objects; we encounter beings as objects rather than 
concrete occurrences of being. It is this preoccupation with beings rather than being that 
gives rise to the idea that humans are subjects that stand over and against objects. In 
poetry, however, we are given over to the occurrence of the truth of being. We find 
ourselves not as the masters of language who express truth in propositions, but as the 
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inhabitants of a language and a truth that exceed us: “In the everydayness of Dasein, we 
are expelled from poetry, cast blind, lame, and deaf upon the shore, and neither see nor 
hear nor feel the surge of the waves in the sea” (HH 24). Poetry has the power to open us 
to these surging waves and to establish a space where we can encounter the strife of earth 
and world.  
 I then turn to the work of Georges Bataille, especially the so-called “confessional” 
or “mystical” writings of the 1940s, to further develop the possibility of thinking and 
writing with the body. Though my goal in this essay is not to enact a point by point 
comparison, Heidegger and Bataille share a thinking that takes human experience, indeed 
human existence, as caught up in a “movement that exceeds it” (AS 26). As we saw, for 
Heidegger, this movement precedes the human, and the calling of the human is to bear 
witness to and preserve this fundamental occurrence of being.  
 Like Heidegger, Bataille sees the non-disclosive aspect of language as crucial to 
an understanding of the truth of being. Bataille, however, sees poetry as only a necessary 
but insufficient moment that can lead us to a more radical experience of being exceeded: 
ecstasy. For Bataille ecstasy is not an exceptional or entertaining state, but is rather the 
very truth of human existence: “Oneself is not the subject isolating itself from the world, 
but a place of communication, of fusion of subject and object” (IE 16). To succumb to 
ecstasy is to give oneself over to this excessive occurrence, which reveals nothing but the 
“naked fact” of being (IE 35). This naked fact is not presence or facticity, but the singular 
movement of creation and destruction that creates galaxies, humans, and mountains, only 
to dissolve them once again.  
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 Bataille names two bodily experiences—laughter and eroticism—as effusions of 
this ecstatic truth. In both of these cases, I will show how the body becomes a site for this 
truth’s occurrence. In the erotic, one loses one’s particularity through the communication 
of pleasure with one or more partners in a non-productive expenditure of energy. 
Laughter irrupts into and interrupts discourse, affirming the cosmic absurdity of being 
human, of being “neither God nor an oyster” (USN 103).  
 Finally, I examine the bodily practice of meditation that Bataille develops 
following the Christian mystic Angela of Foligno. This practice, I argue, is not a method 
sensu stricto, but rather a bodily discipline of exposure by which Bataille opens himself 
to the bodily occurrence of ecstasy. Through an entangling of thought with bodily 
pleasure and pain, Bataille develops a way of thinking and writing that cannot be 
separated from the body’s non-disclosive, ecstatic comingling with and exposure to the 
world. 
What I find in the memorization and recitation of poetry, then, is neither the body of 
science, the body of everyday projects and concerns, nor even the discursive body of 
socio-historical subjectivity. Rather, I find the body transformed into a site for the 
disclosure of that which has no secret to disclose. In the conclusion, I offer a few brief 
remarks on the potential of this poetic-ecstatic body to transform philosophy as well, 
blurring the boundary between thought and poetry, philosophy and bodily practice.  
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CHAPTER II 
HEIDEGGER’S EARTHLY POETIZING 
 Before proceeding it will be helpful to make a few remarks about my reading of 
Heidegger. Heidegger’s thinking presents an especially difficult task for anyone wishing 
to engage it, and even more so for anyone wishing to write “about” it or use it as an 
opening to think something beyond it. Heidegger never saw his thinking as a “system” in 
the traditional sense that word carries in German philosophy. Near the end of his life, 
Heidegger wrote a kind of maxim (Leitspruch) for the Gesamtausgabe on the first page 
of the first volume of the massive collection: “Wege—nicht werke” (GA1:437). Ways, not 
works. Heidegger’s writings do not present discrete and self-contained answers to 
questions that can be fit together into a larger picture; they “question along a way” (CP 
6). To question along a way is not to build a system, but to follow the paths opened by 
the question wherever they lead. It means allowing the question to show the way rather 
than assuming that something as complicated and obscure as the question of being will 
give rise to a neat, logically consistent metaphysical system of conditions, existents, 
concepts, and deductions. This is not to say that Heidegger’s thought does not have 
certain ground notes to which it constantly returns or that his texts are not rigorously 
interconnected, but rather Heidegger’s thought cannot be reduced to an apparatus for the 
production of concepts or a collection of technical terminology. Heidegger calls us to see 
being as fundamentally question-worthy and thought as the faithful questioning thereof; 
being is not a riddle to solve, but a mystery to question.  
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 One of the guiding threads of this questioning is the insight that being is a verb 
and not a noun. It is crucial to keep in view that Heidegger does not think of being as 
“fundament,” or “substance” but rather as an occurrence: be-ing is the way in which 
beings are. This verbal, evental quality of being informs and guides Heidegger’s 
thinking. As we will see, even “truth” and “world” are not qualities of propositions or 
totalities of existents, but occurrences, happenings (Geschehen). The consequences of 
this shift in thinking are tectonic and a failure to attend to the importance of this quality 
of Heidegger’s thought will result in the very metaphysical reification Heidegger’s 
thinking attempts to undo.  
Thinking “questions along a way” (CP 6). Though it is neither system nor 
doctrine, it must allow itself to be guided by a sensitivity and receptivity to the 
occurrence of being. The job of the philosopher is not to “make sense” or systematize this 
occurrence into a perfectly logical machine that applies concepts to experience, but rather 
to remain faithful to being, to allow being to speak, in this case to allow being to speak 
through the body. The guiding question of my reading of Heidegger, then, is not “what is 
the body?” but rather, “how is the body involved in our experience of being’s 
occurrence?” 
 
The Zollikon Seminars 
Heidegger’s most direct engagement with the question of the body occurs in the 
Zollikon Seminars, a series of seminars and lectures given to a group of psychologists and 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
psychoanalysts studying with Dr. Medard Boss.1 Though the entirety of the seminars is 
not devoted to the problem of the body, it is nonetheless a central theme. In one seminar, 
Dr. Boss poses Sartre’s objection to Heidegger’s lack of explicit engagement with the 
body. Heidegger’s response is telling: “I can only counter Sartre’s reproach by stating 
that the bodily [das Leibliche] is the most difficult [to understand] and that I was unable 
to say more at the time” (292). The starting point of such an engagement, for Heidegger, 
lies in the distinction between the body as a material object (der Körper) and the body as 
the “lived” body of phenomenological experience (der Leib). Indeed, Heidegger defends 
this essential distinction against critics such as Sartre:  
One often hears…that there is something wrong with the distinction 
between a corporeal thing [der Körper] and a lived body [der Leib]. That 
is raised, for instance, because the French have no word whatsoever for 
the lived body, but only a term for a corporeal thing, namely le corps 
(116).  
So what is this essential distinction between the corporeal thing and the lived 
body? Whereas French has only a world for a corporeal thing—le corps—German has 
two distinct words for the body: der Körper and der Leib. Körper names the body as an 
object, a corporeal thing that can be studied and explained according to the physical laws 
of causality. Körper is the objectified, scientific approach to the body. A surgeon, for 
                                                
1 For more on the history of Zollikon Seminars, the personal relationship between Boss 
and Heidegger, and the relation of the seminars to psychoanalysis, see Richardson, 
“Heidegger Among the Doctors” in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993). 
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example, operates on Körper. Körper is the body considered as a material object, which 
is to say that Körper is measurable and essentially quantifiable. One encounters der 
Körper in the “natural world,” wherein “space is discovered non-circumspectfully by just 
looking at it, [and] the regions of the surrounding world get neutralized to pure 
dimensions” (BT 112). Leib, by contrast, is the body in the sense of space-making and 
being-in-the-world. It is “a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to 
receive-perceive” (ZS 293). Leib, for Heidegger, is nonobjectifiable because it does not 
name a “thing” that could be made into an “object,” but the bodily way in which we exist. 
The surgeon may operate on a Körper, but he does so through Leib as the bodily aspect of 
being-in-the-world. 
 One way to begin thinking the difference between Körper and Leib is in their 
limits. Körper begins and ends at the skin: “I am seated here at the table, and fill this 
space enclosed by my epidermis” (ZS 112). This space may change drastically over the 
course of a lifetime, but it is essentially measurable. One can quantitatively calculate the 
“volume” of Körper, because measurability belongs to the essence of Körper as a 
material object.  
The limit of Leib, however, “is the horizon of being within which I sojourn” (ZS 
113). The limits of Leib are in no way “measurable” like the limits of Körper, because the 
limits of Leib are the limits of my being-bodily. Heidegger puts it rather poignantly when 
he notes that Leib moves not within physical space, but within “the depth opened up in 
each case of my being-in-the-world” (ZS 107). So what is this depth within which Leib 
moves? Heidegger gives several phenomenological examples in order to clarify the space 
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within which Leib moves. One of the most helpful is the example of making-present. He 
dwells on the idea of making-present the Zurich train station: “While making-present we 
are at Zurich’s train station itself. Making-present has the character of being-at…more 
precisely, of our being-at the station” (ZS 90).  
First of all, one must resist the conflation of making-present with either imagining 
or recalling. The differentiation between recalling and making-present is somewhat 
obvious: I can make-present a place I have never been or even a place that does not 
actually exist (as in literature or film). “Imagining,” however, implies that one is at a 
place “merely in thought,” which obscures the bodily aspect of making-present:  
If we interpret [making-present] in this way [as occurring “merely in 
thought”]…then we misinterpret the phenomenon of making-present so 
thoroughly that we substitute an entirely different phenomenon for it…we 
replace it with the phenomenon of imaginary representation (ZS 91-2).  
So in contradistinction to imagining or recalling, making-present is a bodily 
experience of being-at a place: “This ‘being-at’ is usually characterized by the bodily 
perception of things physically present. But our being here can also engage itself in being 
with things not present physically” (ZS 94). The making-present occurs in a bodily 
(leiblich) way because it occurs in Dasein’s capacity for “making-space” (ZS 19). This 
spatiality, however, is not the quantitative geometric space of material-locatedness. It is 
to be understood, rather, “in terms of my own…involvements with things…that I ‘bring 
near’ in my daily activities” (Aho 34). In other words, Dasein’s bodily nearness is 
determined by its concernful encounters with beings in the world; I am nearest to the 
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hammer when I am using it, though this nearness disappears if I continue holding it while 
making-present a train station in Zurich. While making-present the Zurich train station, 
the train station is nearer to my lived body (Leib) than the physical surroundings of my 
corporeal, objectified body (Körper).  
The making-space of Leib is the way in which the body is involved in Dasein’s 
way of being as being-in-the-world: “Spatiality can be discovered only on the basis of 
world; indeed, space co-constitutes the world in accordance with the essential spatiality 
of Dasein itself with regard to its fundamental being-in-the-world” (BT 113). Here, world 
bespeaks the the network of “significance and referential relationships” that allows us to 
experience occurrences and other beings as meaningful, rather than as “objects” 
encountered in a vacuum and made meaningful through the application of concepts (Boss 
366). As we saw above, Dasein’s being-in-the-world means that its spatial character is 
not based on locatedness in measureable space but in its “circumspect dealings” (BT 80). 
This means Leib—as the bodily dimension of being-in-the-world—is the bodily way in 
which one understands a hammer by picking it up and using it without having to define it 
conceptually. Indeed, “circumspect being-in-the-world is spatial” (BT 110, emphasis 
added). As opposed to measurable distance, the worldly distance of Leib is “understood 
in the context of familiar accessibility, where equipment is ‘near’ or ‘far’ in terms of 
being ‘to hand,’ available for use” (Aho 34).  
Bodily being, then, occurs “wherever the senses are involved,” but only insofar as 
the senses are engaged in the understanding of being, i.e. in Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
(ZS 245). This can occur when one makes-present a foreign land as well as in the 
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“sensory design of a painting by an artist” (ZS 245). In this way Leib is involved in the 
“receptive/perceptive relatedness to something which addresses us from out of the 
openness of our world, from out of that openness as which we exist” (ZS 293). Leib is the 
receptive/perceptive way in which “something addresses us,” in our spatial being-in-the-
world. In the world, we are addressed or called by various phenomena; we are not 
volitional subjects who encounter objects (or, in a more complicated example, other 
subjects) and decide to use them, conquer them, defeat them, etc. Our being-in-the-world 
means that innerworldly beings address us, appear to us, and become present to us; we, in 
turn, respond to these addresses.  
Things are given to us in the world, and we respond to them. To use Heidegger’s 
famous example, I encounter a hammer (within a network of references of usefulness); 
my understanding of being is not revealed in an ability to adequately describe the 
hammer with concepts, but rather in whether or not I pick it up and let it be relevant to 
the task of building shelter. It appears to me, and I either let it be what it is or not. My 
“understanding of being” has to do with my bodily involvement with the things around 
me, in two senses. The most obvious sense concerns the fact that my body interacts with 
the things around me in a manner that discloses my familiarity with their usefulness and 
relevance—I pick up the hammer and use it. In another sense, however, my using the 
hammer shows that it is “near” to me in the sense we outlined above; it shows that the 
hammer is near to me as something available for circumspect involvement. Andrew 
Mitchell describes “Dasein’s ‘existential’ space” as one determined by “utility and 
efficiency. Nearness is governed by utility” in a space “built for projects” (Mitchell 7). In 
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making-present the train station, we see that space is no way the physically present or 
quantifiable; it’s nearness bespeaks involvement and being-in-relation rather than 
locatedness. This is the space of Leib, completely distinct from the quantitative space of 
Körper. 
For Heidegger, then, the distinction between Körper and Leib is not one of 
degree: Leib is not a “thing” in the way Körper is a thing. Leib is the way in which we 
exist bodily in the world: “The body is only insofar as it is body-ing forth [Der Leib ist 
nur insofern er leibt]” (ZS 113). Körper never uses the hammer; to use something is to 
enter into a relation with that thing, and only Leib is the relational body of being-in-the-
world. One might be able to describe the physiological processes of a prehensile hand 
gripping a hammer, but this is not the same thing as using that hammer, as being-in-
relation with the hammer. What Heidegger indicates with the Leib/Körper distinction is 
precisely this difference between the bodily occurrence of our being-in-the-world (Leib) 
and the objectified material thing we call the body (Körper). 
 
World 
 This understanding of Leib, however, limits itself to the everyday existential 
space of utility and relevance. Later Heidegger’s thinking of spatiality will expand to 
include experiences no longer governed solely by the quotidian involvements of everyday 
being-in-the-world. The rather limited explanation of Leib in The Zollikon Seminars may 
have to do with the conditions of their delivery. The seminars were given in the 1950s 
and 60s, but to an audience only familiar with Heidegger’s early works (namely, Being 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
and Time). By the 1950s, however, Heidegger’s thought had shifted dramatically. In the 
1930s, Heidegger’s thought undergoes what scholars call “the turn” [die Kehre].2 Though 
it is outside the scope of this discussion to dive deeply into the scholarship around the 
turn, it suffices to say that Heidegger’s thought becomes less and less concerned with a 
descriptive phenomenology of the everyday and increasingly about probing the 
“originary” and “essential” occurrence of being.  
 During this period, Heidegger begins experimenting creatively with language in 
order to find new ways of thinking and writing that will speak the verbal, evental 
character of being rather than the metaphysical reification of subjects and objects. This 
often involves sentence constructions that lack a clear subject and instead describe 
“occurrences” [Geschehen]; the appropriation of older spellings and words (being [sein] 
is written with the archaic spelling beyng [seyn]); and intricate wordplays that utilize 
German’s system of root words and prefixes (to hear [hören] being is to belong 
[gehören] to being). This is not to say that there is no continuity between the early 
thought and the later works, but rather to point out that Heidegger’s thought undergoes 
important shifts that require careful attention as he moves from a phenomenology of the 
everyday towards an ontology of the essential. References will still need to be drawn to 
the earlier work, but certain thoughts change quite significantly. 
After the turn, for example, Heidegger’s thinking of world changes dramatically. 
Heidegger moves away from thinking “world” in terms of everyday relations of 
                                                
2 I point out that scholars call it the “turn” [die Kehre] because the term link, the bond 
between Dasein and being in Heidegger’s thought (Sheehan 82). See also Heidegger, Die 
Technik und die Kehre (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002). 
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significance and concern and begins probing after a more originary sense of world. That 
is to say, he begins pursuing a thinking of world that would ground the everyday world of 
meaningful encounters, but would also capture the more historical and epochal sense of 
worldhood. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger develops this more originary 
sense of the world:  
“World worlds, and is more fully in being than all those tangible and 
perceptible things in the midst of which we make ourselves to be at 
home…Wherever the essential decisions of our history are made, 
wherever we take them over or abandon them, wherever they go 
unrecognized or are brought once more into question, the world worlds” 
(OWA 170).  
World is no longer only the everyday world of relations of projects and concerns within 
which things appear meaningful, but now also speaks to the space within which history 
unfolds. Wherever the question of being is addressed or brought into question, wherever 
questions of destiny and meaning and are interrogated, the world worlds. According to 
Michel Haar, “the concept of world is [thus] intrinsically linked to the notion of epoch, so 
much so that it seems to be cofounded with it” (58). He goes on to argue that this 
epochal-historical space of “world” is the space within which being becomes 
understandable; being “is not understandable outside of its epochs” (ibid.) Being is not 
given eternally or in the same way in every epoch. The force of Heidegger’s turn to 
being-historical (seinsgeshichtliche) thinking is to make this epochal, historical character 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
of being uncircumventable. Being discloses itself always within and from out of a 
particular historical world.  
This discussion of world, however, takes place in the context of discussing what 
makes a work of art a work—what “work” does the work of art accomplish? “To be a 
work means to set up a world” (OWA 170). In order to return this discussion, at least 
provisionally, to the topic at hand I will examine a work of art other than Heidegger’s 
Greek temple—David’s The Death of Marat. The Death of Marat is a painting of a 
profoundly worldly body. The painting is historical in the everyday use of the word 
insofar as it represents an important historical event (the murder of revolutionary 
journalist Jean-Paul Marat by Charlotte Corday) and marks a transformational moment in 
the development of French neoclassicism as a turn away from the decadence and 
aristocratic whimsy of rococo.3 At the level of historical decision and destiny, however, it 
sets-up Marat’s corpse as that of a martyr through the use of gentle light that comes in 
from the upper right corner of the canvas and falls beatifically on his face and arms. In 
addition to this reference to a long tradition of Christian martyr and dead Christ paintings 
(the placement of the arms, for example, mirrors that of Christ in Caravaggio’s 
Entombment), the stage-like setting of the isolated, sculptural body and its proportionality 
recall the legacy of classical Roman sculpture, which, in turn, bespeaks the republican 
                                                
3 David’s The Oath of the Hortaii, another monumental panting in the history of French 
neoclassicism, further bears witness to another world-historical dimension of 
neoclassicism: the profound influence of the excavation of Pompeii in the mid-18th 
century. Not only were the revolutionaries reclaiming their Roman heritage of 
Republicanism, but the artists as well were reclaiming the proportionality and austere 
simplicity of classical art.  
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appropriation of the Roman legacy so important to the French revolution. David sets up 
the body of Marat as a call to the French people to claim their destiny and remain resolute 
in their decision to become “Rome reincarnate” (Benjamin 395). The Death of Marat is 
nothing if not a decisive and destinal painting, and this decisiveness sets-to-work the 
world-historical character of the French Revolution.4 In setting up a world, art “holds 
open” the worldly space where decisiveness (or indecisiveness) with regard to destiny 
occurs. Like the Greek temple, The Death of Marat “gives…to men their outlook on 
themselves” (OWA 168). It is in this way that the work of art “holds open” the world-
historical character of being: “in the reflected glory of this splendor there glows, i.e. there 
clarifies, what we called the world” (OWA 169).  
 
Earth 
The light is no mystery,  
The mystery is that there is something to keep the light 
From passing through. 
-Richard Siken, “Visible World” 
 
Heidegger goes on to say that the essence of art is not only the historical setting-
up of the world, but also the setting-forth of the earth, on which the world rests: “in 
setting up [aufstellen] a world, the work sets forth [herstellt] the earth” (OWA 172). The 
worlding of the world is the holding-open of the space of world historical decisions; 
indeed, the world is nothing but this open space within which things are disclosed and 
“[given] their look” (OWA 168). Earth, conversely, appears as that about which there is 
                                                
4 Indeed, a quick Google search of the terms “Death of Marat” and “Charlie Hebdo” 
returns dozens of blog entries and op-ed pieces about the murdered Charlie Hebdo editor 
Stephane Charbonnier as the inheritor and repetition of Marat. 
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nothing to be decided and out of which nothing is disclosed: “earth appears openly 
cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is essentially 
undisclosable” (OWA 172, emphasis mine). Just as “upon the earth and in it, historical 
man grounds his dwelling in the world,” the artwork sets-up a world (and holds it open) 
on the basis of its setting-forth the earth. The Death of Marat sets forth the earth in the 
way its light dissipates gently from right side of the canvas to the left, the ever so slight 
way the crests of the folds of cloth make contact and separate, and the way the 
brushstrokes, especially in the wood grain of the box and the negative space above the 
figure, make visible the subtle intertwining of color and texture.  
There is nothing to be decided about the texture of brushstrokes, the shining of 
color, or the undulation of cloth; they do not teach a moral lesson, disclose a historical 
situation, or call for revolution. In other words, the being-art of the painting is not 
reducible to (though also not indifferent to) the political, historical, and personal aspects 
of the work. Being needs the worlding of the world in order to be encountered as 
understandable, but there remains some part of being that exceeds the understandability it 
obtains in the worlding of the world: “something of the non-historical must continually 
enter into this history, conform to it, be informed by it, but also withdraw from it” (Haar 
58). History unfolds upon the face of the earth, which is the inscrutable and nonhistorical 
ground of the historical and understandable worlding of the world. The “work” of the 
work of art is to present both earth and world in their mutual and inextricable self-
differentiation. A tool, by contrast, consumes its earthly quality and, insofar as it is 
encountered as a tool, does not bring the earth into the open space of the world: 
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Because it is determined by usefulness and serviceability, equipment takes 
into its service that of which it consists: the matter…[earth] disappears 
into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable the less it 
resists vanishing in the equipment being of the equipment (OWA 171).  
The work of art, unlike equipment, allows the earth to appear as earth:  
To be sure, the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it…But he does 
not use it up….To be sure, the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way 
that color is not used up but rather comes to shine forth. To be sure, the 
poet also uses the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers 
who have to use them, but rather in such a way that the word only now 
becomes and truly remains a word (OWA 173).  
“Earth” names the dimension of being that remains unsayable. It is not an “ineffable” 
beyond that cannot be brought to language, but rather the aspect of being that has nothing 
to say for itself. It is the part of being that can be witnessed but not conceptualized, heard 
but not made to speak.5  
 Near the end of the “Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger claims the essence of 
all art, as the setting to work of truth, is poetry. The trajectory of the “Origin of the Work 
of Art” is not towards a taxonomy of the various ways in which different artistic 
mediums set truth to work, but rather towards the essence of the artistic occurrence of 
truth: “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is as such, in 
essence, poetry” (OWA 197). The strife of earth and world, of unconcealing and 
                                                
5 For more on this idea of listening to that which cannot be made to speak, see Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Listening (Fordham: Fordham UP, 2007). 
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concealing, is the “open place” within which beings “shine and ring out,” no longer as 
things, tools, objects, or particulars, but as beings. Indeed, this is precisely what 
distinguishes poetry from prose in the typical sense. In poetry, it is not only the 
disclosive, worldly, meaningful aspect of language that is brought into view, but also the 
earthy, concealing, nondisclosive aspect; poetry is the “saying which, in preparing the 
sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world” (OWA 199). This is 
the aspect of language that is itself unsayable, but is an essential part of all saying; it is 
part of language from the most technical jargon to the most everyday small talk, but the 
work of poetry is to allow it to ring out as it is.  
My contention is that this earthly, unsayable (but not ineffable) dimension of 
being is irreducibly bodily; the shining-forth of color, the ringing-forth of words, and the 
bodying-forth of texture can only appear as nonsense or mere decoration to a metaphysics 
of the subject. The thickening and quickening of language in poetry cannot be explicated. 
“Explicate” comes from the past participle of the Latin explicare, to unfold or unravel. 
One cannot take apart, unroll the words of a poem and expect them to remain unaltered; it 
is precisely the way they strike the ear and roll off the tongue that gives them their 
specificity and singularity. There is not a neutral meaning behind the words that express 
it that could be obtained by unrolling the words, by explicating their meaning.  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner enacts this truth about 
language through the use of margin annotations and commentary throughout the poem. 
Part of the genius of the Rime comes precisely from its enactment of this failure of 
conceptual knowledge to grasp the essence of poetic language. Throughout the poem, the 
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margin annotations attempt to summarize and explicate the stanzas, each time failing to 
capture the poetry that gives the Rime its uncanny beauty. After having shot the 
Albatross, the Mariner’s ship comes to a complete and supernatural standstill in the 
middle of the ocean:  
Down dropt the breeze, the sails dropt down 
’Twas sad as sad could be;  
And we did speak only to break 
The silence of the sea!  
… 
Day after day, day after day,  
We stuck, nor breath nor motion; 
As idle as a painted ship 
Upon a painted ocean 
 
Water, water, every where, 
And all the boards did shrink; 
Water, water, every where, 
Nor any drop to drink.  
 
The very deep did rot: O Christ! 
That ever this should be!  
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs, 
Upon the slimy sea.  
(Rime 52)  
The margin annotation for the first stanza reads “The ship hath been suddenly becalmed,” 
and the annotation for the last two stanzas moralizes, “And the Albatross begins to be 
avenged.” In terms of the narrative and normative content of the poem, these may indeed 
be accurate explications, but they certainly don’t replace the stanzas themselves. The 
sensory richness of “Slimy things did crawl with legs, / upon the slimy sea” far exceeds 
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any moral or narrative function, and the repetition of “Day after day, day after day” is not 
superfluous reiteration but the very rhythm of the poem’s telling.  
 In these failures of explication, we see that the work of poetry is to tarry with the 
bodily aspect of language. “Bodying forth occurs wherever the senses are involved” (ZS 
197) not because sense-data can be quantified into wave-lengths, but because the bodily-
sensory dimension of being that poetry allows to shine forth remains irreducible to 
concepts. Against what Kant thought, “There is no sensory affection which must be 
supplemented by a concept of the understanding;” Indeed, “Kant did not see the body at 
all” because he only saw the sensible as data in need of subsumption under concepts (ZS 
199). The earthly dimension of poetry, then, is not a romantic flight into some fanciful 
“beyond,” but rather the opposite: it is precisely this earthly, bodily dimension of poetry 
that grounds poetry, and art more generally, in the concrete, spatio-temporal dimension of 
being. It is not the scientific concept, but the poetic word that refers us to the truth that 
our very being remain inseparable from our being-bodily.  
 
Strife 
It would be easy here, however, to hypostasize the difference between earth and 
world, perhaps as a difference between “form” and “content” or “subject matter” and 
“material.” Yet world and earth are neither two different types of matter, dialectical 
opposites, nor opposite terms in a proposition, but are rather two equally essential and 
interrelated aspects of being that appear in their strife. In this strife, world and earth 
cleave to one another, inseparable in their mutual differentiation: “world and earth are 
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essentially different from one another and are never separated…Yet the relation between 
world and earth does not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with 
one another” (OWA 174). “Cleave” is one of those delightful words that has two 
antonymic meanings. To cleave a piece of meat is to separate it into two (as with a meat 
cleaver), but when the Psalmist declares, “If I forget thee Jerusalem, may my tongue 
cleave to the roof of my mouth,” it means precisely the opposite—to stick or to cling. In 
other words, “to cleave” has an irreducible polyvocality; it means both to separate and to 
unify. To say that earth and world cleave to one another is to say that they differentiate 
one another and establish their specificity only insofar as they appear together, insofar as 
they appear “in a way that lets them shine forth in their differences and belonging 
together” (Vallega-Neu 86). Furthermore, this cleaving of earth and world is not a 
primordial act that lies in a mythical past, but an always occurring cleaving. The 
relationship between earth and world is verbal; it is a happening.  
The Rime is again instructive here. The language of the poem is not only deftly in 
tune to the earthly dimension of the poetic word, but also its world-historical dimension. 
The margin narrations that I discussed above not only enact the failure of discursive 
knowledge to explicate poetic language, but also situate the poem such that it seems to be 
speaking to us from the mists of an ancient time. The scholastic practice of systematically 
annotating the margins of texts for future readers was woefully outdated by the time of 
the Rime’s composition and publication.  Even the spelling of the title as Rime instead of 
the modern “rhyme” would have seemed intentionally antiquarian by the time Coleridge 
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first published the poem in Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads in the 1790s.6 The ambiguous 
nostalgia for both the sublime glory and sovereign violence of earlier times is an 
important historical resonance in Coleridge’s work, as well as many of the later “second 
generation” romantics.7 In other words, it isn’t that there are some earthy words in a 
poem and some worldly ones. The opening of Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan,” for example, 
sets-forth the earthly pleasure of the words “In Xanadu did Kubla Khan / a stately 
pleasure dome decree,” while simultaneously setting-up the worldly space of great rulers, 
foreign lands, and the fog of centuries past (“Kubla Khan” 103). One could never finally 
settle whether the earth or the world gives the poem its beauty; its beauty comes precisely 
from the undecidable tension between them.  
The relation between earth and world, then, is one of movement and strife; put 
otherwise, it is an occurrence in which “world, in resting upon the earth, strives to 
surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed” (OWA 174) One need 
                                                
6 The modern spelling—“Rhyme”—was standard by as early as 1560, a full two centuries 
before Coleridges’ poem. 
 
7 Percy Shelley’s “Ozymandias” especially comes to mind:  
I met a traveller from an antique land, 
Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone 
Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand, 
Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown, 
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, 
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read 
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, 
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed; 
And on the pedestal, these words appear: 
My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings; 
Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair! 
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare 
The lone and level sands stretch far away (Shelley 198).  
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only recall the all too common reaction to “abstract” painting: “Ok, but what does it 
mean?” This drive to force brushstroke, shape, color, texture, or composition to reveal 
some “meaning” is the world attempting to force the earth to disclose its secret. The strife 
of earth and world, however, is not a unilateral conflict: “the earth, however, as sheltering 
and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there” (ibid). The 
all too common answer to “What does this painting mean?” is often a dismissive and 
conceited, “it’s just art.” As if Barnet Newman’s Stations of the Cross or Frank Stella’s 
Die Fahne Hoch! do not appear within a space of theological, historical, aesthetic, and 
political intersections, and contestations. The specificity of art’s work-being resides in its 
presenting this strife between earth and world, between refusal and disclosure, as strife. 
To return to The Death of Marat, the falling of the light on Marat’s face is not only 
worldly or only earthly; it has a worldly aspect and an earthly aspect, neither of which 
can be given “priority” if it is to retain its status as a work of art. The beam of light is 
worldly insofar as it situates Marat within a tradition of martyrdom and sacrifice and calls 
the French people to claim their historical destiny; it is earthly insofar as it is also simply 
shines “and wants only to shine” (OWA 172). In a work of art, earth’s self-seclusion is 
not forced open, yet the world still discloses itself as world; the strife of earth and world 
manifests itself as a strife. This is the setting-to-work that the work of art accomplishes: it 
sets truth to work.  
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Truth and the Poetic Word 
Truth is not a process of exposure that destroys the secret,  
but a revelation which does justice to it. 
-Walter Benjamin 
 
What is truth? Truth is such a noble thing that if  
God were able to turn away from truth,  
I would cling to the truth and let God go. 
-Meister Eckhart 
 
But what “truth” is set to work in the work of art? It is precisely this very strife of 
earth and world, “the opposition of clearing and concealing” itself that Heidegger calls 
truth (OWA 186). Heidegger is not only rejecting the idea that “truth” inheres in a certain 
kind of propositional representation, but that truth describes any thing, quality, or state at 
all. Truth is “the movement of simultaneous closure and disclosure in which be-ing 
occurs” (Vallega-Neu 86). In other words, the propositional “truth” that either correctly 
or incorrectly describes a state of affairs takes place only the basis of a more originary 
access to beings: “Truth is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an 
‘object’ by a human ‘subject’ and then ‘are valid’ somewhere…rather, truth is disclosure 
of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds” (ET 127). Truth occurs 
concretely in the way in which beings both disclose and refuse themselves; the work of 
art does not “represent” a truth beyond itself, but is rather the concrete, spatio-temporal 
establishing of truth’s occurrence. Truth only “establishes itself in the strife,” and cannot 
therefore “exist in itself beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only subsequently to 
descend elsewhere among beings” (OWA 186). 
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Because truth is not a metaphysical essence that exists somehow beyond beings 
but rather a spatio-temporal occurrence, it does not always occur in the same way; works 
of art do not all set-to-work the same truth. Heidegger insists that truth is always 
disclosed in an “attunement” [Stimmung]. Attunements are “the how according to which 
one is in such and such a way” (FCM 67). In everyday experience, attunement is 
“ontically what is most familiar and an everyday kind of thing: mood, being in a mood” 
(BT 130). Attunements, which are the ground and inner possibility of something like 
“psychological” moods, however, are not simply moods; an attunement is rather “an 
existential, fundamental way in which Dasein is its there” (133). In other words, the 
access and relation to being that defines human being changes in accordance with the 
character of this access and relationality. If we are with a person “overcome by grief,” 
for example, we find that he is “inaccessible…The manner and way in which we can be 
with him, and in which he is with us, has changed…He draws us into the manner in 
which he is, although we do not necessarily feel any grief ourselves” (FCM 66). No 
amount of will-power or “positive thinking” can change this attunement, and there is no 
such thing as non-attuned existence: “Attunements are the fundamental ways in which we 
find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the how according to 
which one is in such and such a way” (FCM 67). The example of being-with others in an 
attunement of grief shows that even when another person is closed-off, the disclosure of 
our being-with them does not disappear—it appears in the mode of being-closed, of 
impenetrability. 
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Importantly, however, Heidegger thinks not all attunements are equal. There are 
certain fundamental attunements [Grundstimmungen] that not only disclose beings to us 
but being as a whole. Heidegger’s most famous example is anxiety [Angst], which 
“reveals the nothing” by allowing being to appear in its totality as withdrawal or 
recession (WM 101). In anxiety being as a whole is disclosed precisely because it is 
slipping away from us, revealing the nothingness that is inseparable from being. In 
everyday attunements, this or that being is disclosed to us, while in fundamental 
attunements being as a whole, being as such, is disclosed. In keeping with the fact that 
attunements are the unavoidable how that always accompanies disclosure, Heidegger 
develops several different fundamental attunements. There is, for example, a certain 
boredom that is not boredom with this or that thing, but rather  
irrupts when ‘one is bored.’ Profound boredom, drifting here and there in 
the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and 
human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference. 
This boredom reveals beings as a whole (FCM 99).  
Attunements, or rather Dasein’s being-attuned, are a fundamental character of existence 
in two ways. They refer us to the fact of our thrownness, of the finitude disclosed because 
we find ourselves in a world not of our choosing, attuned in a way that exceeds our 
private moods. Second, they show that the truth of being—being’s disclosure—is not an 
affectively neutral, universal truth that appears “dressed” in a certain attunement, but 
rather that the disclosure of being—truth itself—is always-already attuned.  
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The fact of truth’s being-attuned, like the setting-forth of the earth, cannot be 
thought without the body’s involvement. In a moment of anxiety, for example, being’s 
disclosure as withdrawal and recession into nothingness is not a mere intellectual 
curiosity but an existential crisis. One’s hands sweat and shake; the heart races and the 
body trembles. In the indifference of deep boredom, one’s limbs feel viscous and heavy. 
In joy, one’s feet feel lighter and colors seem to shine more brightly. These are neither 
epiphenomena of an incorporeal truth nor indicators that attunement is a psycho-somatic 
“state of mind.” Rather, in attunement one encounters one’s own being-bodily. 
Phenomenologically, one need only think about the difference between “understanding” 
one’s own mortality at a rational level and confronting it in anxiety. I know quite well 
that I and everyone I love will die someday, but this knowledge does not on its own make 
me anxious. Only in the bodily, concrete disclosure of this truth in anxiety am I claimed 
by this truth. Just as the work of art does not “express” a pre-existing truth, the truth of 
my being-finite does not preexist my being-anxious; in a moment of anxiety, I am the 
concrete occurrence of this truth. 
The work of art, if it is to carry out the poetic establishing of truth, must be 
written from out of one of these attunements. For Heidegger the task of the poet is not to 
be “creative” in the sense of the romantic genius or the modern individualist artist, but 
rather to say a fundamental attunement. The essence of poetry, then, is not a certain genre 
of literature or a form of writing, but the occurrence of poetizing [Dichten]. In poetizing, 
truth is set to work in the “imagistic word” (E 289). The poetizing imagistic word, unlike 
the word considered as a vehicle for the transmission of data, does not treat language as 
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something to be possessed, mastered, and bent to one’s own ends; in poetizing, the poet is 
appropriated by the occurrence of truth in language. The poet is no longer a heroic 
genius who expresses their innermost feelings, but rather a concrete, bodily site for the 
establishing of truth in poetry. This is not, however, a romanticism wherein an 
otherworldly “message” is brought to earth through the conduit of a poet; truth does not 
pre-exist its establishing. It simply means that the poem and the poet are nothing but this 
concrete occurrence of attuned truth through the imagistic word. In poetizing “the telling 
is not simply the result of the positioning of words and arranging of lines,” but rather it is 
the attunement that guides the poetizing (HH 18). Poetizing is the allowing-to-occur in 
language of a fundamentally attuned truth.  
 This rethinking of poetizing as allowing-to-occur, as the attuned establishing of 
truth, however, requires a new approach to reading and encountering poetry. If the task of 
the poetizing poet is to say the disclosure of truth within a certain attunement, then the 
job of the reader or listener cannot be to break apart the poem into its components or to 
find the “hidden” truth or meaning “behind” its metaphors. The work of art sets to work 
the occurrence of truth and the job of the listener or reader is to give oneself over to this 
occurrence. In the usual approaches to a poem—reading for pleasure or academic 
analysis—“it is we who dispose over the poem as we will. But our task is the contrary: 
the poetry is to prevail over us, so that our Dasein becomes the living bearer of the power 
of this poetry” (HH 21). Part of the work of the reader or listener, then is to belong to the 
poetic occurrence of truth, which means to give oneself over to the attunement within 
which that truth is occurring. To become “the living bearer” of poetry is to give oneself 
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over to the concrete occurrence of truth. In bearing the truth of poetry, we not only hear 
the poem’s “message,” but, as we say in English, feel it in our bones. This means that in 
both reading and writing poetry, one must always give oneself over not only to the 
worldly, meaningful dimension of the work, but also the earthly, bodily dimension of the 
poem’s occurrence of truth. 
To read Rime of the Ancient Mariner, then, requires first and foremost attuning 
oneself to the poem’s truth. Against the will to master the poem by summarizing its 
narrative and thereby arriving at a “moral” or “meaning,” one must stand within the 
uncanny intertwining of horror and wonder that animates the poetizing of the poem. 
When the Mariner bemoans, “The many men so beautiful / and they all dead did lie: / but 
a thousand thousand slimy things / lived on; and so did I” (56), the task of the reader is 
not to analyze the mariner’s psychological state, but to stand with the mariner in this 
disclosure of truth.8 The essence of the poem lies not in its rhyme or composition, but its 
establishing of a site where we can stand with the poet in the experience of truth. 
Poetizing withstands the occurrence of truth by standing within truth’s attuned 
occurrence. This withstanding is not only withstanding in the sense of standing against, 
but also in the sense of with-standing, standing with, perhaps even standing within. In the 
first sense, however, one is not “withstanding” poetry by resisting its disclosure; rather 
insofar as the poetic occurrence of truth exposes us to being, rendering us no longer 
                                                
8 Again the tension the between the marginal notation and the stanza is striking. The 
margin notation reads: “The mariner despitheth the creatures of the calm and envieth that 
they should live, and so many lie dead” (56). Not only does this fail to capture the beauty 
of the stanza, but obscures the fact that the mariner is revolted by the sea-creatures and 
yet feels a deep, shameful kinship with them.  
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“Metaphysical humans [who] have overstepped the word and left it behind as a tool they 
themselves possess and master,” poetizing requires that we withstand this exposure, this 
loss of the illusion of mastery (E 255). The second sense, that of standing-with, names the 
fact that the poetizing of the poetic word exceeds our particularity as an individual. In 
withstanding the exposure of the occurrence of the truth, we stand with the poem and the 
poet in this disclosure of truth.  
 Standing on the deck of motionless ship, surrounded by the ghastly, non-rotting 
corpses of his shipmates, the mariner experiences his being-estranged from humanity and 
his being-with the “slimy things” that “crawl with legs upon the slimy sea.” The poem 
does not only offer an expression of Coleridge’s philosophical concept of the sublime, 
but also extends an invitation, a call to stand with the mariner of the deck of that 
motionless ship and withstand the becoming-uncanny of being itself. This establishing of 
a bodily site for the experience of being’s becoming-uncanny is the very poetizing of the 
Rime.  
In this withstanding of poetizing (as standing-with the establishing of truth), we 
find ourselves exposed to truth. The body is not a “mortal coil” that encloses a soul or is 
animated by a volitional subject, but rather a site of exposure that dis-closes our own 
being-exceeded by being. Through the experience of poetry, we encounter the earthly 
dimension of being and the concrete bodily exposure of ourselves to an occurrence that 
exceeds us; in poetry, we glimpse the truth of ourselves as be-ings—spatio-temporal 
occurrences of being.  
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In Heidegger’s thinking of poetry as the establishing of truth in the imagistic 
word, then, we find an irreducibly bodily way of thinking truth and experience. To return 
to our starting point, we can now pose Leib as not only the way in which the body is 
involved in everyday being-in-the-world, but also as the sensory receptivity to the 
setting-forth of earth in work of art. If we were not fundamentally bodily beings, we 
could not bear witness to the shining of color and the resonance of words; the earth refers 
us back to our concrete spatio-temporal existence as bodily beings. In examining 
Heidegger’s thinking of poetizing, we saw that poetry, insofar as it establishes an image 
of the attuned occurrence of truth, allows us to stand within the experience of our being-
bodily as being-exposed. Poetry is not the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
designation of a certain linguistic artifact as a poem, but an experience of the truth that 
what it means to be human is to be a bodily site for the occurrence of being. In poetry, we 
learn the truth of being-human as being exceeded and claimed by being itself in the strife 
of earth and world. 
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CHAPTER III 
BATAILLE’S ECSTATIC TRUTH 
The years pass, and people continue to entertain the illusion that some day they 
will be able to talk about Bataille. Because of this illusion they never really come to grips 
with his work which is of capital importance…An earnest wish: may the younger 
generation do it for us, do what we did not dare. 
Marguerite Duras  
 
For as this appalling ocean surrounds the verdant land, so in the soul of man there 
lies on insular Tahiti, full of peace and joy, but encompassed by all the horrors of the half 
known life. God keep thee! Push not off from that isle, thou canst never return!  
Herman Melville 
 
In this chapter, I will turn to the work of Georges Bataille in order to examine a 
different strife—that of continuity and discontinuity. Bataille understands human being as 
uniquely situated between two modes of experience, two ways of being in the world. The 
first, which Bataille calls discontinuity, understands being as discrete, separate beings. 
This reification and separation of being into objects, according to Bataille, provides the 
ground for thinking in terms of self-preservation, utility, and calculation. Put another 
way, discontinuity responds to the “necessities” of life and makes possible the realm of 
labor, of projects, and discursive reason. Discontinuity provides the ground for useful 
human activity and knowledge by dividing up being into self-identical objects named by 
discursive concepts. According to Bataille, however, discontinuity is not ontologically 
grounded, but is rather a necessary illusion; we are not actually discontinuous, discrete 
beings separate from one another, but are rather only momentarily-emerging waves in a 
great ocean of being. This groundless and oceanic movement of being is what Bataille 
calls continuity. According to Bataille, humans are unique in their experience of existence 
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as discontinuous; animal life lives in oceanic continuity, while humans remain 
necessarily in an agonizing tension between the discontinuity demanded by the necessity 
of labor and the continuity we cannot deny as mortal, material beings. Bataille is not 
strictly speaking “anti-discontinuity,” but rather wants to contest the disappearance of 
experiences of continuity and spaces for encounters with these experiences. We need the 
discontinuous world of labor, but we need not therefore subject our entire existences to 
its rule.  
My contention is that Bataille’s thinking of continuity, like Heidegger’s thinking 
of poetry, is one of bodily exposure. Like Heidegger’s earth, Bataille’s continuity refuses 
both utility and explication, and Bataille also finds a deep intimacy between poetry and 
the interruption of everyday experience. Unlike Heidegger, however, Bataille treats 
poetry as only a slight glimpse onto a more dramatic experience of exposure—ecstatic or 
mystical experience.  
I will begin by briefly explicating Bataille’s ontological argument for the strife of 
dis/continuity in the “systematic” texts of his later career, namely The Accursed Share, 
Theory of Religion, and Erotism. Next, I turn to the Summa Atheologica, Bataille’s 
intensely personal collection of writings from the time around and during World War II, 
wherein he elaborates several irreducibly bodily avenues to the ecstatic experience of 
exposure, namely eroticism and laughter. An intense orgasm or a burst of laughter is a 
bodily disruption of discursive reason. Wishing to intensify these experiences by 
breaking down the habits of discontinuity, however, Bataille seeks further after a 
“method of meditation,” a bodily discipline of exposure that would leave one open to 
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experience these ecstatic disruptions. One of these methods, which I will take up in the 
final section, Bataille takes from the bodily meditations of the medieval Christian mystic 
Angela of Foligno. Through an examination of this practice, I will show how bodily 
practices can be brought into thought in order to disrupt the hegemony of discourse and 
labor.  
 
Neither God nor an Oyster 
My words poorly announce the melancholy I feel that I am neither God nor an 
oyster. 
-Bataille 
 
But to be constantly asking “What is the use of this?” is unbecoming to those of 
broad vision and unworthy of free men. 
-Aristotle 
 
Bataille’s entire thought circulates around an obsessive conviction, neither 
dogmatically assumed or grounded in argument, but rather derived from experience: the 
world of discursive knowledge and utility is a necessary but regrettably hegemonic 
illusion that obscures the fact of being’s ontological groundlessness. This tension 
between useful and wasteful, knowable and unknowable, transcendence and immanence, 
grounded and groundless, constitutes the protean core of Bataille’s thought. In his later 
texts—especially Theory of Religion, The Accursed Share, and Erotism—Bataille 
provides an explanation of this tension in terms of economics, the natural sciences, and 
sociology. Economically, he explores the fact that every economic system (including the 
natural circulation of energy) produces far more than could ever be put to use, and 
thereby necessitates the wasteful expenditure of resources (AS 21). Sociologically, he 
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investigates the religious and social practices of various groups (including his notorious 
account of Aztec human sacrifice in both Theory of Religion and The Accursed Share). In 
Erotism, he uses scientific accounts of asexual and sexual reproduction to differentiate 
between discontinuous and continuous beings and to elaborate the link between death and 
the erotic.  
I want to begin, however, with a kind of mythological Urhistory of humanity 
Bataille provides in Theory of Religion.9 This mythological genesis story begins in 
animality: “Animality is immediacy or immanence” (TR 18). Bataille argues that “the 
goshawk eating the hen does not distinguish it clearly from itself, in the same way we 
distinguish an object from ourselves,” because this would require the positing of the 
object (ibid.). The animal is not a subject that experiences itself over and against a world 
of objects, but “is in the world like water in water” (TR 19). Bataille calls this oceanic 
situation “intimacy” or “continuity.” The animal exists intimately without any notion of 
itself as a discrete identity to alienate it or estrange it from the world. Indeed, the lion is 
not the gazelle, but it is more like “a higher wave overturning the other” than a self-
conscious subject negating another through violent self-assertion (TR 19). For Bataille, an 
animal is continuous with this its world; to be “lost in the world like water is lost in 
water” is to exist in continuity.  
                                                
9 Bataille himself admits that the narrative of animality and humanity is “considered from 
a limited position” that “seems questionable,” but he nevertheless finds it a useful way to 
introduce the problem of dis/continuity (TR 9).  
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 The transition to humanity, for Bataille, begins with representation and the ability 
to form a sense of subjectivity divorced from one’s surroundings (CH 49).10 The situation 
of human being is unique insofar as it has the ability to transcend nature, to become 
discontinuous. This discontinuous way of being posits the object and thereby reduces 
“‘that which is’ to the order of things” (AS 57). In this order, we find “the separate 
positing of each thing, reduced to the use that is has” (ibid.) Things, posited as discrete 
objects in a discontinuous world rather than waves in the ocean, are determined by and 
reduced to their use-value.  
 For Bataille, however, the dividing up of the universe into discrete, useful things 
does not only change our attitude towards things and animals, but introduces “a world 
where a man can be merely a thing” (AS 56). Bataille understands the positing of the 
world of objects as the simultaneous positing of the subject as an enclosed identity that 
stands over and against the world of objects. Following Hegel, Bataille sees the 
emergence of discontinuity as linked to the simultaneous emergence of reified relations 
among subjects and the reduction of some subjects to things, to slaves. This is why 
Bataille often refers to discontinuity and discursive reason as servility: “No one can make 
a thing of…the slave without at the same time estranging himself from his own intimate 
being, without giving himself the limits of a thing” (56). The discontinuous world of 
subjects and objects, then, is one in which alienated humanity defines not only the objects 
it uses but its very existence in terms of utility and projects.  
                                                
10 I am not aware of any secondary literature on the subject, but it should be noted that 
this idea bears a striking similarity to Lacan’s mirror stage. See, Lacan, “Some 
Reflections on the Ego,” in Écrits (New York: Norton, 2007).   
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Nonetheless, this discursive operation of objectification that introduces the order 
of things and the world of labor, is never complete. The pre-discursive world of intimacy 
is always rumbling just beneath the smoothly functioning production of knowledge and 
completion of projects. Even at its most efficient, discontinuous reason cannot escape the 
fact that a certain share—the accursed share—of being cannot be put to use. Bataille 
argues this point both economically and phenomenologically. In The Accursed Share, he 
starts from the simple observation that “the living organism, in a situation determined by 
the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is 
necessary for maintaining life” (AS 21). This excess energy can only be wasted. This 
“leftover” portion of energy, Bataille argues, is “wrongly supposed to be insignificant” 
(AS 13); rather “it is not necessity but its contrary, luxury, that presents living matter and 
mankind with their fundamental problems” (AS 12). The wasteful expenditure of this 
accursed share of energy—whether in the form of war, human sacrifice, or saturnalia, 
refers us to the fact that we are not discrete subjects but rather only temporary points of 
exchange in a vast “economy” that exceeds us in every way and ultimately has no end. In 
the “luxurious squandering of energy in every form,” we “destroy that which [we] 
consecrate,” by affirming that our narrow utilitarian view of the world is not an 
ontological truth, but “a transcendent illusion” (Land 64). 
This “luxurious squandering,” Bataille argues, is the basis of sacrifice. He points 
out that, etymologically, sacrifice means to “make sacred,” and, he continues, to be 
sacred is to have value in oneself and not because of some use-value (VE 119). By 
destroying a valuable object, we remove it from the limited means-ends economy of the 
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profane and restore it to its sacred status as something beyond use, something that can 
only be affirmed by being destroyed. Furthermore, this useless expenditure of the 
accursed share is necessary to the functioning of the restricted economy of means-ends 
(hence the term “general economy”). This is the explosive paradox of the accursed share, 
of the sacred: not only does the functioning of a restricted economy depend on an 
operation whose logic it cannot recognize, but the wasted part, the accursed share is the 
only thing of value in the entire economy, precisely because it is not conceived of in 
terms of use-value. It is a “true end” and not merely a relative end.  
Using Bataille’s example of the farmer, we can quickly see the problem of a 
purely restricted economic view of the world: “The stick digs the ground in order to 
ensure the growth of a plant,” whose value is in turn given only reference to the feeding 
of the farmer, whose value is only given in terms of his ability to dig the ground and 
grow the crops (TR 28). Only by sacrificing the crops, taking them out of this endless 
deferral of meaning, can they become a true end: “the absurdity of an endless deferral 
only justifies the equivalent absurdity of a true end, which would serve no purpose” (29). 
Bataille’s idea of “general economy” is a rethinking of political-economy that would 
reintroduce the idea of a “true end” into the study of economics; it is an economics 
founded not on “incentives” and “rational agents,” but on sacrifice, on expenditure 
without reserve, on waste.  
Bataille, however, also explores the sacred as a question of sociological inquiry. 
Indeed, insofar as general economics still understands the sacred as an “object,” it may 
not go far enough. The sacred is not simply what has been sacrificed, but the experience 
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of sacrifice: “What a ‘true end’ reintroduces is continuous being, lost in the world like 
water in water” (TR 29). Religion, according to Bataille, grows from the primordial 
yearning we feel for the sacred intimacy of continuity, but it errs insofar as it posits an 
externalized continuity in the form of a transcendent God.11 Organized religion, 
especially Catholicism, offers an interesting paradox for Bataille: on the one hand 
religion offers a space removed from the profane world of labor. The burning of incense, 
the Eucharist, and the collective chants and singing retain traces of what Bataille 
considers a more ancient, more intimate form of ritual communication with the sacred 
intimacy of continuity. On the other hand, Bataille holds to Nietzsche’s diagnosis that 
organized religion, especially Christianity, reifies artificial hierarchies and, through the 
idea of salvation, reintroduces into the sacred the structure of project and utility. 
Furthermore, Bataille accuses organized religion of having “made the sacred substantial” 
(VE 243); the sacred, for Bataille, is not any being beyond being or transcendent God, but 
rather “the opposite of a substance that withstands the test of time, it is something that 
flees as soon as it is seen and cannot be grasped” (241). Indeed, the sacred is nothing but 
“the most ungraspable thing that has been produced between men: the sacred is only a 
privileged moment of communal unity, a moment of convulsive communication” (242).  
Even in the world of work outside the church, however, “sudden openings” 
appear “beyond the world of useful works” (AS III 231). Drinking a glass of wine after 
work, for example, sometimes “there enters a miraculous element of savor” that does not 
                                                
11 Though Bataille talks of “religion” in general this way, it is clear that he is referring to 
the Abrahamic religions. There are some scant engagements with Buddhism and 
Hinduism in Inner Experience, but in general Bataille means the religions of the Book by 
the term “religion.” 
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contribute anything to the world of work and utility (AS III 199). An economist might be 
able to give an account of how drinking wine is a “reward” to motivate me to return to 
work the following morning, but this is true only in a restricted sense; the miracle of 
flavor, the bodily, sensual pleasure of a good glass of wine always-already exceeds the 
attempt to place it an economy of means and ends. Indeed, “human life [is] full of 
moments…when the ceaseless operation of cognition is dissolved” (AS III 208). Usually 
we ignore these moments, treat them as interesting fascinations, or explain them in terms 
of the very discontinuity they interrupt (as with the economist’s explanation above). For 
Bataille, however, these moments are the “hour of truth,” brief experiences when we are 
not subjugated to discontinuity, but are rather immersed in the intimacy of being like 
“water in water.”  
The account of the positing of the world of objects that Bataille gives in Theory of 
Religion and The Accursed Share, however, remains an “external” description of 
intimacy. The political-economy of The Accursed Share may indeed give a coherent, 
perhaps even convincing, account of the limitations of the discursive, utilitarian world of 
subjects and objects, but Bataille is nonetheless insistent that intimacy of being in the 
world like water in water is an experience. Theory of Religion and The Accursed Share 
use the tools of scientific discourse to show the limitations of those very tools, but they 
thereby betray the elliptical postscript to Theory of Religion: 
“TO WHOM LIFE IS AN EXPERIENCE TO BE CARRIED AS FAR AS 
POSSIBLE…I have not meant to express my thought but to help you 
clarify what you yourself think…You are not anymore different from me 
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than your right leg is from your left, but what joins us is  THE SLEEP OF 
REASON—WHICH PRODUCES MONSTERS” (113, ellipses in 
original).  
So what is this experience carried as far as possible that joins humans in a useless, non-
discursive intimacy? It is ecstasy. 
 
Being-Oceanic  
But where do those waves of everything that is great and sublime in man finally 
flow? Is there not an ocean for these torrents? Be that ocean.” 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §615  
 
Ecstasy is the undergoing of intimacy, the experience of the sudden appearance of 
the sacred within the profane, of impossible continuity within the realm of discontinuous 
possibility. Whereas Theory of Religion and The Accursed Share develop a theory and 
history of the human’s odd place between the immanence of animality and the 
transcendence of God, Bataille’s Summa Atheologica attempts to communicate an 
experience of intimacy rather than explain its history and ramifications. The Summa 
Atheologica, whose title invokes Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, was written around and 
during World War II. Bataille’s Summa comprises three books—Inner Experience, 
Guilty, and On Nietzsche. While these texts neither constitute a coherent system nor a 
confessional autobiography, they are markedly different from Bataille’s other non-fiction 
works. In the Summa, Bataille does not so much develop a theory or argument as much as 
he tries to let “experience to lead [him] where it was leading, not to some end given in 
advance” (IE 9). Bataille states “at once, that it does not lead to a harbor (but to a place of 
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bewilderment, of nonsense).” This restless place of bewilderment is what Bataille calls 
inner experience or ecstasy.  
In this section, I will first sketch an outline of Bataille’s experience of ecstasy, 
relating it to the claims about intimacy in the previous section. Next, I will examine why 
this necessitates Bataille’s idea of communication, which must not be confused with 
representation or expression. Finally, I will show how the thinking of communication 
cannot be thought as a private experience of a subject, but is rather a dispossessing event 
that claims the one who experiences it by exceeding their particularity.  
Bataille begins Inner Experience with a simple clarification: “by ‘inner 
experience’ I understand what one usually calls mystical experience: states of ecstasy, 
ravishment” (IE 9). In terms of our preceding discussion, ecstatic inner experience is the 
human experience of being in the world like water in water: “In the sunlight this 
morning…an infinitely simple life, blending with the stones, the moss, the sun-filled air” 
(ON 15). Bataille is not painting with metaphor when he claims to experience a “blending 
with the stones, the moss, the sun-filled air,” but is rather trying to communicate the 
feeling of ecstatic release when “Oneself is not the subject isolating itself from the world, 
but a place of communication, of fusion of subject and object” (IE 16). Despite his deeply 
Hegelian inclination, Bataille’s fusion is not a “synthesis” that “joins” subjects and 
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objects.12 Indeed ecstasy is only “fusion” from the standpoint of discursive reason; just 
prior to the statement about the “fusion of subject and object,” Bataille remarks that 
ecstasy “only…appears to unify what discursive thought must separate” (IE 15, emphasis 
added). Ecstasy is not so much the fusion of subject and object into a higher unity, but 
rather the dissolution of the illusion of discontinuity; in ecstasy, one does not reach a 
higher plane of consciousness but rather sinks back into the oceanic continuity which 
discursive reason carved up into subjects and objects.  
As we saw in the previous section, Bataille does not see discontinuous existence 
as ontologically grounded, but rather as a representational illusion. In his response to 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s essay on Bataille, Blanchot underscores the fact that “isolated being is 
the individual, and the individual is only an abstraction, existence as it is represented by 
the weak minded conception of everyday liberalism” (18). Ecstasy dispels these 
abstractions and places one back into continuity. It is not “a window on the outside, on 
the beyond, but a mirror”and reflects the truth that “subject, object are perspectives of 
being in the moment of inertia…that all representation of the object is phantasmagoria” 
(IE 59).  
Continuity is ontologically prior to discontinuity, but discontinuity is the 
experiential home and norm for human beings. Ecstasy is not, then, a particularly 
                                                
12 Bataille’s relation to Hegel and Kojeve is one of the most discussed issues of 
scholarship surrounding Bataille. See, especially, Gemarchak, The Sunday of the 
Negative: Reading Bataille Reading Hegel (Albany: SUNY UP, 2003); Gasché, Georges 
Bataille: Phenomenology and Phantasmology (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012); Land, The 
Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (London: Routledge, 
1991); and Derrida, “From a Restricted to a General Economy: A Hegelianism without 
Reserve” (in Writing and Difference, Routledge, 1980). 
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captivating or entertaining psychological state; it is “the hour of truth”—an experience of 
the groundless movement of be-ing (G 27). Jason Wirth puts it concisely: Bataille’s 
claim, following Nietzsche’s injunction, to have “become the ocean” is “obviously not 
correct. It is true in a way that renders traditional truth untrue” (Wirth 132). Ecstasy 
names the way in which discontinuous human beings can be claimed by the ontological 
truth that discourse obscures by carving up the world according to clear and distinct 
ideas, and thereby sheltering itself from the abyssal movement of being. If the world of 
isolated subjects investigating objects through discursive reason produces knowledge that 
makes projects and labor possible, then ecstasy is not a “state” one could “know,” but is 
rather an encounter with the impossible truth of being, with what Bataille calls 
nonknowledge.  
Nonknowledge, however, is not merely the inverse of knowledge.13 In a 
discussion of Descartes, Bataille asserts, “It is easy for each of us to perceive that this 
science [of discursive knowledge], of which Descartes is so proud, even complete with 
the answers to all the questions that it can regularly formulate, would leave us in the end 
in nonknowledge” (IE 108). Nonknowledge does not contest the usefulness of discursive 
knowledge, but rather contests that discursive knowledge can offer any truth beyond this 
usefulness; nonknowledge affirms the groundlessness of knowledge that Nietzsche 
                                                
13 This seems to me to be the clearest point of departure between Bataille and the 
Surrealists with whom he always occupied an intimate but dissident relation. See Wirth 
“The Dark Night is Also a Sun: Bataille’s Mad Game of Writing.” 
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famously posed in the opening lines of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.”14 For 
all its usefulness in completing projects and guiding action, knowledge cannot avoid what 
nonknowledge reveals: “that the existence of the world, cannot, in any way, cease to be 
unintelligible” (IE 108). Nonknowledge, then, is neither a higher form of knowledge nor 
its opposite, but rather the fact that “where you would like to grasp…nontemporal 
substance, you only encounter a slippage” (IE 97). Nonknowledge—as the continual and 
irreversible slippage of all knowledge—does not disclose an “answer” or provide a new 
form of knowledge, but rather reveals that human existence is nothing but an irresolvable 
enigma, an answerless question posed by our uniquely torturous position as 
dis/continuous being. This understanding of being as an irresolvable enigma is the basis 
of one of Bataille’s most terse formulations of ecstatic nonknowledge: “supplication 
without response” (IE 12, emphasis added).  
 
Communication 
Throughout Inner Experience, Bataille repeats and modifies a certain phrase that 
serves as a mantra of nonknowledge: “NONKNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATES 
ECSTASY” (IE 57). One person does not communicate to another person; 
                                                
14 “In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar 
systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the 
highest and most mendacious minute of "world history"—yet only a minute. After nature 
had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die. 
One might invent such a fable and still not have illustrated sufficiently how wretched, 
how shadowy and flighty, how aimless and arbitrary, the human intellect appears in 
nature. There have been eternities when it did not exist; and when it is done for again, 
nothing will have happened.” (Nietzsche 139). 
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communication is the ecstatic movement within which one is swept up with others, into a 
“community having no object but experience” (IE 35). This means that ecstasy is above 
all not a mental state belonging to an individual, but is rather the way in which a human 
being can be related to the excessive, turbulent occurrence of being; there is no decisive 
act of the will that enables one to achieve ecstasy. If there were, then, “nonknowledge 
would still be knowledge. I would explore the night! But no, the night explores me” (IE 
153). The nonknowledge of ecstasy exposes one to truth that “I am and you are, in the 
vast flux of things, only a stopping point…a brief moment of pause” in the “the violent 
movement of worlds [that] will make of your death a splashing foam” (IE 97). This truth 
is not knowledge because it does not allow us to clarify a concept or carry out a project; it 
is a truth that claims the one who bears it without thereby giving them a solid ground on 
which to escape this violent movement. It continuously throws one back into this vast 
flux and offers no respite, no ground. 
Nonknowledge, then, is not the “outcome” of ecstasy and cannot be deduced, 
attained, or justified; it communicates ecstasy. “Communication,” which is an integral 
part of Bataille’s thinking of ecstasy, has to be interpreted carefully. In contemporary 
English, “communication” rings of the transmission of data, as in “telecommunications.” 
In reading Bataille, however, we should hear the etymological resonances of communion 
and community instead. Communication is ecstatic communion with the turbulent ocean 
of being. According to Nancy’s reading of the Christian tradition, the ritual of 
communion solidifies the presence and concreteness of God’s being through the ritual 
assertion, “hoc est enim corpus meum,” and thereby grounds the knowledge of an infinite 
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life to come after we pass through the finitude of this earth (Corpus 3).15 The Christian 
communicates with God through the communion. The ecstatic atheologist, on the 
contrary, is communicated with by the “celestial bacchanalia” of vast transferals and 
squandering of energy without either temporal or teleological end.  
This communication of nonknowledge does not ground presence, but rather 
initiates the displacement of all ground and presence. Which is to say, nonknowledge 
communicates “a principle of insufficiency at the base of human life” (IE 85). Ecstasy is 
the communication of human finitude and insufficiency through experience. In 
discontinuity, the subject sees her particular identity as the ground of her being and seeks 
to preserve this particularity; ecstasy opens up this particularity to the fact of its being 
only a momentary eddy, a temporary congealing of particles with no real permanence or 
solidity. Humans are insufficient in relation to the metaphysical understanding of 
ourselves as grounded subjects who can assert our wills and control the world around us, 
who can “become everything” (IE 3).16 When Bataille speaks of “laceration” or the 
“wound,” he is indicating the experience of this principle of insufficiency to subjectivity; 
ecstasy wounds, lacerates the self-enclosed subjectivity of discontinuous human life, and 
                                                
15 Nancy’s recent “deconstruction of Christianity” takes many of its cues from Bataille 
and Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche. See, Dis-Enclosure (New York: Fordham UP, 2008) 
and Adoration (New York: Fordham, 2012).  
 
16 This tension between the subject wanting to “become everything” and confronting the 
principle of its insufficiency seems to form an important point of tangency between 
Bataille’s thought and Schelling’s On The Essence of Human Freedom. To my 
knowledge the only authors who have broached this connection between Schelling and 
Bataille in any sustained way are Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life (Albany: SUNY UP, 
2003) and Gasché, Georges Bataille: Phenomenology and Phantasmology (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2012). 
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communication opens this wound until subjectivity can no longer maintain itself: “I 
stretch the laceration out: at this moment, I reach the point of ecstasy” (G 31). 
Communication occurs through this “chink the armor” of individual identity (ibid.). 
Which is to say, ecstasy exposes. In ecstasy, the movement of being sweeps up an 
individual and ruins their individuality by exposing them to the excessive event that 
brings everything from sea urchins to galaxies into being only to return them back to 
nothingness. 
 
The Vertigo of Nudity 
Ecstasy, however, does not only arise through a careful deconstruction of 
metaphysics. Importantly, Bataille consistently links this ecstatic communication of 
nonknowledge to two bodily occurrences: eroticism and laughter. My claim is that this 
bodily character is essential; eroticism and laughter are two bodily effusions that disrupt 
discontinuous identity and communicate ecstasy.  
The link between the erotic and the ecstatic is both incredibly common and 
exceedingly obscure, but Bataille, in usual fashion, offers a definition that is stirring and 
provocative, if not particularly clear: “Eroticism, it may be said, is assenting to life up to 
the point of death” (EDS 11). To assent to life is not to attempt to preserve it through 
work and project, but to give oneself up to its movement; labor and self-preservation 
subordinate life to the future, to its preservation for the future. To assent to life 
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necessitates a confrontation with the point of death, insofar as its movement does not 
exclude death, but rather includes it.17  
This, however, may seem to have little to do with what we ordinarily mean by the 
erotic. For Bataille the erotic is not simply synonymous with sexual activity; there can be 
eroticism without sexual intercourse, and there can certainly be mechanical, non-erotic 
sex. The erotic is the aspect of sex that has nothing to do with reproduction. The erotic 
names the experience of sex not as a chore, as a labor necessary for the continuation of 
our species or the creation of a child, but rather as a vertiginous attraction, an enticement 
to expend one’s energy without thought of the future and to feel a deep, bodily intimacy 
with another. Bataille’s infamously obscure pronouncement that “the sexual act is to time 
as the tiger is to space” (AS 13) is not a surrealist exercise of nonsense. It is rather a 
precise comparison of the wastefulness of resources and energy that constitutes both the 
existence of large predators like tigers and the frenzy of sexual excitement. If life cared 
only for efficiency, there would be only single-celled organisms reproducing asexually; 
instead we have the absurdity of eroticism and the excessiveness of the tiger.  
                                                
17 Though I hope the reader will not take my citation of a neuroscience study as an 
attempt to “prove” the experience of ecstasy in the erotic, Anjan Chaterjee’s The 
Aesthetic Brain is instructive here. Chaterjee notes that neural activity in certain brain 
areas drastically decreases during orgasm. These areas include the “ventromedial 
prefrontal context [which] is engaged when we think about ourselves and our fears...the 
ends of the temporal lobes [that] organize our knowledge of the world…and the 
parahippocampus [that] represents our knowledge of the external world” (87). Chaterjee 
suggests that these results point towards a “captivated” picture of orgasm: “Perhaps it 
means that the person is in a state without fear and without thought of themselves or their 
future plans. They are not thinking about anything in particular and are in a state in which 
the very boundaries that separate them from their environment have disappeared” (87). 
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The erotic body is no longer the body of work, of labour and self-concern, but 
rather what Jean-Luc Nancy calls “the body of pleasure,” which is “detached from the 
schemas of perception and operation. It is no longer available…to any of the usual ways 
of its functional, active, relational life” (Corpus II 93).18 The erotic body, the body of 
pleasure that is nonetheless deeply connected to pain, always haunted by the possibility 
of a violent turn, loses itself in its touching and its being-touched, and thereby  
organizes itself around itself, that is, around this contact of bodies that has 
no end other than itself: around this contact that is also the contact of the 
same body with itself. For it is precisely in this way that it no longer is or 
has a "self" but is exposed in its entirety (Corpus II 96).  
The erotic is the undergoing of the body as exposure in several senses. The body 
is materially exposed, laid bare and vulnerable; the line between violence and eroticism is 
notoriously thin.19 In eroticism, we succumb to this exposure and abandon our 
protections. The erotic body exposes the identity and particularity of the self to a 
mingling with another or others, to the communication of pleasure. Giving and receiving 
                                                
18 Nancy quickly notes that the body of pleasure and the body of pain are simple 
inversions. In pain, the same disruption occurs but the in the mode of a withdrawal rather 
than a laying-open. 
 
19 This constant intertwining of violence and sensuality has given Bataille an interesting 
place in feminist philosophy. While some like Patricia Yaeger argue that Bataille’s 
thinking entails an incredibly problematic affirmation of sexual violence, others like Julia 
Kristeva and Amy Hollywood find important resources in Bataille for thinking sexual 
difference and the experience of gendered bodies, despite his often transparently sexist 
language. See Yaeger “"Consuming Trauma; or, the Pleasures of Merely Circulating” 
(Extremities, 2009), Hollywood “Beautiful as a Wasp: Georges Bataille and Angela of 
Foligno” (Harvard Review of Theology, 92:2, 2002), and Kristeva Powers of Horror: 
Essays on Abjection (New York: Columbia UP, 1982).  
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pleasure in an erotic encounter quickly becomes difficult to differentiate; two or more 
people are swept up in a movement of pleasure, sometimes unable to differentiate whose 
pleasure is whose, precisely because the very specificity of the “who” no longer holds 
sway. Finally the erotic body exposes one to a compulsion that supersedes and disrupts 
worldly concerns: “What is blurred is everything that is organized for—subordinated 
to—the task of effecting something external” (Corpus II 93). The being-swept-up of 
eroticism reveals the “unjustifiability” of ecstasy; though the social scientist may ask the 
question, an erotic body would not be able to provide a “why” for its actions, and yet it 
will sacrifice dignity, social position, and self-concern in the movement of erotic 
excitement: “Silent and naked, isn’t the intimacy of the universe to which you open 
yourself an intolerable dizziness? And isn’t the universe that yawns between your legs 
unfinished? A question without a response” (G 140).  
The erotic, then, is a site in which “the hour of truth” occurs bodily. We already 
saw that ecstasy exposes one to the movement of being. In the erotic, this takes the form 
of nudity: “Nakedness offers a contrast to self-possession, to discontinuous existence…it 
is a state of communication revealing…a continuance of being beyond the confines of the 
self” (EDS 17). Unless it appears within the strictures of a scientific investigation or a 
socially regulated environment (a locker room, for example), the naked body holds a 
vertiginous attraction. Being neither exoskeletal, feathered, nor furry, a naked human is 
exposed to the elements. The attraction is vertiginous because it is a complicated 
amalgam of horror and desire, revulsion and lust. This maddening and indistinct effusion 
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of passion is the first convulsive wave of continuity that distinguishes eroticism from 
mere sexual activity.  
In the explanatory discourse of sexuality, sexual reproduction is usually put forth 
as the goal of sexual activity, and the vertiginous attraction of the naked body is taken to 
be an evolutionary lure for the accomplishment of this goal. Those of us whose sexual 
activity in no way furthers our genetic line, however, see the deep mistruth in this. 
Alphonso Lingis, discussing why the conquistadors found the sodomy of the Aztecs just 
as terrifying as their sacrificial rites, explains that, from a Catholic perspective, 
[Sodomy] attacks the human species as such. Not only does it invert the 
natural finality of organs by which we came to exist; it is directed against 
the imperative to maintain the genus which every positive law, every 
universal, must presuppose. It is the last limit of outrage under the eyes of 
the monotheist god, God the Father…It is the act, unmotivated and 
unjustifiable, that posits the singular one, the monster (Abuses 14, 
emphasis added).  
Sodomy reveals the erotic dimension of sex that exceeds and disrupts every economy of 
evolution and morality within which we have attempted to restrain its terrifying power. 
The intertwining of eroticism and reproduction in heterosexuality does not only constitute 
a clever evolutionary motivation, but also bespeaks the inextricable intertwining of the 
useful and the ruinous that characterizes human existence.  
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Eroticism reveals that the vertiginous attraction of continuity and ecstasy is a 
bodily truth; our body knows intimately that from which the scientific mind recoils.20 
Eroticism is a way in which ecstasy can be communicated through the interactions and 
touchings of bodies. 
 
Contestation  
I MYSELF AM WAR. 
-Bataille 
 
Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance. 
-Heidegger 
 
The intertwining of the erotic and the ecstatic, however, hardly constitutes an 
original contribution to the history of mysticism. Indeed, even the most devout of 
Christian mystics often spoke of bodily erotic experiences of the divine. If Bataille’s 
ecstasy is to be atheological and not simply a return to the religious, we must tease out 
                                                
20 Is it any surprise that Immanuel Kant, perhaps the most elaborate thinker of 
discontinuity in the history of Western thought, is said to have bound his hands at night 
as not to be able to masturbate? 
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the specific difference of his thought from the Christian tradition that informs it, but from 
which it nevertheless distances itself.21 
Bataille’s ecstasy differentiates itself from mystical experience in that “it does not 
lead to a harbor (but to a place of bewilderment, of nonsense)” (IE 9). Bataille’s ecstatic 
inner experience offers no consolation. For Meister Eckhart, perhaps the most famous 
Christian mystic and a common point of reference for Bataille, mystical union 
necessitates that one “no longer feels any torment in his heart for anything 
whatsoever…This means: throw all anxiety out of your heart, so that in your heart there 
can be nothing but constant joy” (Eckhart 75).22 Eckhart goes so far as to argue that a 
truly enlightened Christian would not blink at seeing his entire family put to death before 
his eyes because he would be secure in the knowledge of God’s mercy and the existence 
of the afterlife (ibid.). Even if a Christian like Eckhart does not conceive of God as 
substance, they nonetheless find in God a ground. God is a guarantor of meaning, even if 
that meaning is hidden in this life; God is the guarantor of being’s coherence and 
completion: “A man…wanting to lose himself, situates himself before the universe. If he 
                                                
21 Like his relation to Hegel, Bataille’s relation to mysticism occupies a large portion of 
the scholarship around his thought. Nick Land and Michael Greene tend to downplay 
Bataille’s religious streak, reducing it to clever poetics and transgressive appropriation, 
while Peter O’Connor and Andrew Hussey rather argue that it constitutes the 
uncircumventable core of his thinking. See Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges 
Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (London: Routledge, 1991); Greene, Bataille’s Wound 
(Barrytown: Station Hill, 1998); O’Connor, Georges Bataille and The Mysticism of Sin 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003); and Hussey, The Inner Scar (Atlanta: Rodopi, 
2000).  
 
22 I would remiss not to point out that Eckhart’s thought also had a profound influence on 
Heidegger. See Schürmann, Wandering Joy: Meister Eckhart’s Mystical Philosophy 
(Aurora: Lindisfarne, 2001).  
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sees a completed arrangement in the universe, he is before God” (G 27). Even a deeply 
mystical God like Eckhart’s is ultimately a god of peace and consolation. 
There is joy to be found in Bataille’s ecstasy, but it is the joy of Nietzschean 
affirmation rather than Christian consolation, and it certainly offers nothing that could be 
called “peace;” it comes only after a torturous confrontation with one’s vulnerability and 
finitude. In On Nietzsche, Bataille claims to teach “the art of turning anguish into delight” 
(ON 170) but in Inner Experience he clarifies, “anguish that turns into delight is still 
anguish” (IE 40). The joy of ecstasy is necessarily preceded by and intertwined with the 
torture of the impossible. This torture of the impossible is not the humiliation and shame 
the mystic feels for her sins in the presence of Christ, as when Angela of Foligno laments 
that she “could not imagine a death vile enough” to make up for her sins (Angela 128). 
Angela undergoes the torture of her shame and self-loathing because she nonetheless 
retains the hope of salvation. One supplicates oneself at the base of the Crucifix because 
the situation is not yet impossible—one always retains the possibility, the hope salvation. 
An ascetic renounces this world in hopes of finding a greater reward in the next. Blanchot 
accuses Christian monks of pretending to “divest themselves of what they have, and 
indeed of themselves” not in order to actually dispossess themselves of all possession, but 
rather in order to make themselves “again the owners of everything, with God as 
guarantor” (Blanchot 15). Indeed, the prologue of The Rule of St. Benedict describes the 
logic of monastic life in these terms: “Never swerving from his instructions, then, but 
faithfully observing his teaching in the monastery until death, we shall through patience 
share in the sufferings of Christ that we may deserve also to share in his kingdom” (6). 
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The Christian supplicates herself before God because this supplication guarantees an 
eventual end to her misery; the ascetic suffers in order to earn admission to a world 
without suffering at all. 
Unlike the ascetic, Bataille has “no refuge on earth or in the heavens” (G 104). 
Indeed, for Bataille, “God has no other meaning: alleged refuge.” This is how Bataille 
understands the death of God—the loss of any guarantor. Hence Bataille’s declaration, “I 
cannot say that I myself have not been a student of theology, that my atheism is not that 
of a theologian” (USN 237).  A positivist or a scientist, who would come to atheism 
through rational argumentation has not undergone the catastrophic communication of 
ecstatic nonknowledge, but rather replaced a supersenible guarantor with a newer, 
perhaps more pernicious faith in the manipulability of nature through quantification. I say 
perhaps more pernicious because at least the Christian mystics proceeded from a 
confrontation with the dramatic, the miraculous, the mysterious; unlike the “men of 
science” Bataille impugns, the Christian had the merit of not yet having been reduced to a 
bureaucrat producing useful knowledge.  
Without guarantor, the atheologist seeks only “to ruin that which in [himself] is 
opposed to ruin” (IE 122). The atheologist supplicates himself before an empty night with 
no hope of a possible salvation: “Supplication, but without gesture and certainly without 
hope. Lost and supplicating, blind, half dead. Like Job on the dung heap, imagining 
nothing, night fallen, defenseless, knowing that all is lost” (IE 41, emphasis added). In 
this supplication without response, one is laid bare before the finitude and abyssal 
groundlessness of her existence, but she finds no way out. There is no heavenly 
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consolation or divine punishment on the other side of existence; indeed, there is no other 
side of existence at all, but only the turbulent indifference of “lightning, mud, a vast 
expanse of water, the depths of the earth“ (IE 62). Bataille does not call ecstasy the 
impossible because it cannot be experienced; on the contrary, it is the experience of the 
exhaustion of every possibility of avoiding the hour of truth. Every attempt to know, to 
control, to make sense of existence is a possibility of rest from the storm of birth and 
death. There is, however, no such possibility in ecstasy: “Nothing like that happens: what 
alone remains is the circular agitation—which does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and 
begins again from it” (IE 113).  
Ecstasy, then, is not only a confrontation with the insufficiency of human 
knowledge and useful action (nonknowledge), but also with the absolute finality, 
irreversibility, and meaninglessness of death (the impossible). When Bataille calls ecstasy 
“contestation,” he means that it contests and subverts every attempt to halt its movement, 
to affix it with a meaning, or to put it to work in the service of a restricted economic 
model. The fault of Christian mysticism is to place ecstatic nonknowledge back within a 
limited economy of salvation. Angela thirsts for her death because her belief in God 
points her beyond it. Christ’s sacrifice recoups its losses, so to speak, in the resurrection, 
and the Christian mystic believes the obsessive mantra that has comforted Christians 
since John put wrote it down nearly twenty centuries ago: “God so loved the world that 
the gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but have 
life everlasting” (John 3:16). Secure in the knowledge of the everlasting life of the soul 
(and, for some, bodily resurrection), the Christian mystic avoids the lacerating truth that 
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makes the corpse an object of fascination for the atheologist.23 The atheologist knows the 
decomposing corpse is not a mortal coil from which a soul has been freed, but is rather 
the inevitable dissolution of a wave crashing on a beach. The molecules of the wave 
indeed survive, but any particularity the wave had does not; the same movement that 
gave birth the wave tears it asunder and returns it to the depths. 
The Christian approaches death as the last trial before a final settling of accounts, 
an assigning of meaning through the sorting of souls into the saved and the damned. In 
ecstatic nonknowledge, one does not find answers, but undergoes the displacement of all 
answers, the infinite night of death. Meaning is infinitely destroyed and nobody is saved 
or damned. There are those who laugh and those turn away from this catastrophic 
nihilation, but in the end they both die. The difference is in whether or not they were dead 
before they died, or whether their death was an assenting to life up to its most extreme 
limit. Whereas discontinuous reason allows one to “put off existence…not to die but to 
be dead,” ecstasy contests this deferral and offers the impossible: a taste of death while 
one is still living (IE 46).  
 
                                                
23 One need only read Bataille’s fiction to find evidence of his fascination with corpses.  
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Laughter and Trembling 
A dreadful laugh at last escapes his lips; 
The laughter sets him free. 
A Fool lives in the Universe! he cries. 
The Fool is me! 
-Ray Bradbury 
 
For all this contestation and anguish, however, Bataille is not only a thinker of the 
“torment,” of the lacerating communication of ecstatic nonknowledge. We should not 
forget that Bataille claims to “teach the art of turning anguish into delight” (ON 170) and 
“the practice of joy before death” (VE 235). In the previous section, we saw how the 
contestation of ecstasy allows “no way out,” and does not offer salvation for the 
inexorable finitude of human being. This is, however, no simple nihilism, for “beyond the 
sick ecstasies, you will still have to laugh” (G 150). There are many forms of laughter, all 
of which contain an element of communication, but our concern here is the ecstatic, 
lacerating laughter that finally turns anguish into delight. This laughter does not express a 
recognition of some truth, but is rather the body’s own affirmation of being-exposed in 
ecstasy.  
So what differentiates mad laughter from tragic torment? Laughter notes that the 
finitude of human life is not only the finitude of death, but also the finitude of being 
chance, of being contingent through and through: “I appreciate in myself the 
precariousness of being. It is not that classic precariousness based on the fact that I have 
to die, but a new precariousness founded on the fact that there was very little chance of 
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me having ever been born” (qtd in O’Byrne 1).” 24 As Bataille’s biographer Michel Surya 
quips, “A human being is not only mortal…he is also unlikely” (1). In other words, not 
only can one be sure that he is “not everything and…will die,” but he must also recognize 
that his very coming to existence was abyssally, infinitely unlikely (IE 3). Bataille finds 
in this “precariousness of being” a deeply, if darkly, comedic spirit. The terrifying 
certainty of one’s death is matched only by the laughable contingency of one have been 
born in the first place. In this monstrous combination, Bataille finds the essential 
tragicomic character of the human situation. Ecstasy may not end in the repose of prayer, 
yet it nevertheless does not consist only in tragedy; eventually one has nothing left to do 
but collapse laughing. One can imagine the story of Job but instead of the voice of God, 
Job finds only at the end a burst of maniacal laughter, an affirmation without salvation.  
The ecstatic laughter that turns anguish into delight is not so much a consolation 
or respite as it is an affirmation. In the torment of ecstasy, one recognizes her finitude and 
impotence, being unable to find a ground or control the movement within which they find 
themselves. In laughter, however, she “celebrates the marriage of power and loss” (G 92); 
she recognizes that by being swept up in the turbulent movement of being, she has lost 
her limits and found her power: “I am a throw of the dice, that is my strength” (G 95). 
One laughs because there is nothing left to argue, justify, or explain; in being claimed by 
the double finitude of being both mortal and unlikely, one can only laugh. 
What interests us most here is the fact that laughter is not only an affirmation of 
finitude and contingency, but is a bodily affirmation. Laughter, like the erotic, is bodily 
                                                
24 This quote is only translated as an epigraph in Anne O’Byrne’s Natality and Finitude. 
The French is from Bataille’s Oeuvre Complete 4:444.  
 
 
 
63 
 
 
communication; one does not laugh because one has “recognized” the double-
precariousness of being as both contingent and finite and is expressing that recognition 
via laughter; laughter itself affirms. The moment of bursting into laughter is Bataille’s 
version of the moment of divine merciful intercession in the torment of the mystic 
(Angela of Foligno calls this moment “grace” [Angela 135]). One does not “will” 
laughter, but is seized by it in the absence of any other possible response to the 
impossible situation in which she finds herself.  
Laughter, of course, is not a unitary phenomenon, and it is not only the laughter of 
the mad atheologist that communicates. In a “fragment” of the Summa, Bataille turns to 
the laughter of tickling: “What is essential is the moment of violent contact, when life 
slips from one person to another, in a feeling of magical subversion” (G 129). In tickling 
another, we join them in laughter, in a bodily communication that accomplishes nothing, 
and renders the one being tickled convulsive and absurd. Even in the middle of the most 
quotidian smalltalk, a genuine outburst of laughter gives us a feeling of intimacy if we 
laugh along with another. In a group, “laughter reverberates and grows from one person 
to another,” communicating a movement of continuity (“Contact and Communication” 
120).  
Laughter, however, is not only a bodily form of communication, but also a bodily 
disruption of discursive language. Laughter is the body’s mockery of language, a vocal 
outburst in which the vocal cords do not to transmit information but delight in their own 
excitation. Laughter occurs through convulsions of the vocal cords and does not “utilize 
the external forms of language, but sly glimmerings” of guttural noise (G 128). 
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Furthermore, jokes themselves often rely on the subversion of clear and distinct 
categories that sustain scientific discourse.25 Laughter expresses nothing, does not 
“mean” anything, and has no intentional content at all; laughter communicates 
affirmation.   
Laughter communicates a bodily affirmation of exposure, contingency, and 
finitude. Completely outside any schema of self-conscious representation or intentional 
expression, laughter transforms the body into a site for ecstatic release rather than 
productive labor.  
 
De Imitatione Christi 
My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? 
    Why are you so far from saving me, from the words of my groaning? 
O my God, I cry by day, but you do not answer, 
   and by night, but I find no rest. 
… 
I am poured out like water, 
  and all my bones are out of joint; 
my heart is like wax; 
    it is melted within my breast 
-Psalm 22 
Laughter and eroticism, however, are random outbursts of continuity in 
discontinuous life, unless one has first become open to these experiences. Many people 
laugh and orgasm without ever undergoing the loss of self, and yet these experiences, for 
Bataille, harbor just that possibility. Yet this would seem to present an immediate 
paradox: if ecstatic continuity is the contestation of all utility and teleology, how can one 
                                                
25 I imagine Bataille, like Deleuze, would find himself more akin to Lewis Carroll than 
Gottlob Frege in thinking about the shimmering movements of sense and meaning in 
language. 
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possibly have a method of ecstasy? Bataille’s answers to this question often amount to a 
simple admission of paradox, but he nonetheless develops methods of “meditation” that 
he proposes were helpful to his own experience. Without wanting to dismiss this 
paradoxical character completely, my contention is that these methods are not step-by-
step guides to ecstasy, but rather disciplines of exposure, practices by which one can 
become more open to dispossessing communication. In other words, the goal of these 
exercises to make oneself vulnerable, to strip oneself of the protections that identity 
erects against the crashing waves of continuity. Using one such exercise that Bataille 
takes from Angela of Foligno, I will show this exercise is a practice of exposing oneself 
rather than a method for achieving a state, and that this practice of exposure occurs 
through sensory, bodily meditation rather than intellectual contestation.  
Despite the salvific teleology of Angela of Foligno’s ecstasy, Bataille finds 
something remarkably compelling in her account: “Speaking of God, Angela of Foligno 
speaks as a slave. What she expressed nevertheless grips me to the point of trembling” (G 
14). Bataille finds in Angela not only the night of nonknowledge, but also a meditative 
method, a rigorous discipline of exposure by which one can be more open to 
communication. Obviously, these methods cannot be a step-by-step guide that culminates 
in ecstasy (which would reintroduce not only the primacy of the will, but also the 
actuality of the individual, the structure of project, the idea of salvation, etc). He 
nevertheless insists that ecstasy “cannot reject method” (G 25). Method is not a blueprint 
for attaining ecstasy, but rather “violence done to the habits of relaxation…method swims 
against the current (ibid.).” All the ways we avoid confronting the hour of truth are 
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“habits of relaxation,” and method is not an answer to a question, but a discipline of 
exposure. One cannot attain ecstasy and no method would guarantee its communication, 
but one can develop ways of opening oneself to such an experience. 
In her Memorial, Angela speaks of a certain practice of sensory meditation before 
a crucifix:  
While I was meditating on the great suffering which Christ endured on the 
cross, I was considering the nails, which, I had heard it said, had driven a 
little bit of the flesh of hands and feet into the wood. And I desired to see 
at least that small amount of Christ’s flesh which the nails had driven into 
the wood. And then such was my sorrow over the pain that Christ had 
endured that I could no longer stand on my feet. I bent over and sat down; 
I stretched out my arms on the ground and inclined my head on them (145-
6).  
This sensory meditation on the laceration of the Christic body and the 
intermingling of the word-made-flesh with the vulgar wood of the cross propels Angela 
into being “totally absorbed by this vision” (ibid.) Feeling Christ’s sufferings in her own 
body, Angela “experiences the cross” with Christ in a way that does not concern itself 
with the theological meaning of the crucifixion but rather with its bodily occurrence 
(ibid.). Later, as she is questioned by “Brother Scribe,” Angela will draw conclusions 
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about the magnitude of this pain and why Christ had to undergo it, but in the moment of 
the vision itself, there are no such questions about meaning or justification.26  
The pain of the crucifixion, however, quickly gives way to the joy of God’s 
presence: “Then Christ showed me his throat and his arms. And then my former sorrow 
was transformed into a joy so intense that I can say nothing about it. This was a new joy” 
(146). As we saw in the previous section, the suffering of the laceration of the subject in 
Christianity leads to complete restoration:  
My soul saw this vision so clearly that I have no doubts about it, nor will I 
ever question it. I was so certain of the joy which remained in my soul that 
henceforth I do not believe I will ever lose this sign of God’s presence. 
Such also was the beauty of Christ’s throat or neck that I concluded that it 
must be divine (146, emphasis mine).  
Later in the Memorial, Angela describes another episode brought on by this 
practice of “standing in prayer and meditating sorrowfully on the passion of the Son of 
God incarnate” (180). The meditation leads to an experience of such shattering pain that 
she declares anyone who claims to be able to describe it fully must be a heretic (179). She 
nonetheless attempts to communicate part of the experience:  
My pain, then, exceeded by far any that I have ever experienced…My 
body could not sustain me…I saw such deep pain in the soul of the Son of 
                                                
26 “Because the sins were great and those committing them so numerous, the pain, as a 
consequence, had to be great. Christ, you suffered out of the great compassion that was 
yours for your elect, and because their entire purpose was to destroy you and because 
they did not know you, I perceive that you were submitted to the rudest possible 
treatment” (181). 
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the Blessed Virgin Mary that my own soul was deeply afflicted and 
transformed in such pain as I had never known before; and all my joy was 
gone (181, emphasis added).  
The communication of the passion Angela undergoes is so profound here that it becomes 
absolutely indistinguishable from her own pain, both bodily and spiritual. Angela, then, 
finds a way to lay herself bare by breaking down the usual conceptual evasions of 
continuity through a bodily practice of meditation. Importantly, she does not undergo 
these experiences every time she meditates before the crucifix, but through the discipline 
of remaining focused on Christ’s wounds, she finds a way to expose herself to this 
stigmatic ecstasy.  
Amy Hollywood draws the connection between Bataille’s interest in Angela’s 
meditations on the Passion to Bataille’s own bodily meditations on the suffering of 
another (Hollywood 70). Instead of crucifix Bataille chooses a photograph of a Chinese 
man being tortured to death:  
I had recourse to upsetting images. In particular, I would stare at the 
photographic image—or sometimes my memory of it— of a Chinese man 
who must have been tortured during my lifetime…In the end, the man, his 
chest flayed, twisted, arms and legs cut at the elbows and knees. Hair 
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standing on his head, hideous, haggard, stripped with blood, beautiful as a 
wasp” (IE 121).27  
The writings on this photograph, which span nearly four decades of Bataille’s writing, are 
some of the most troubling and disturbing in a corpus widely known for its scandalous 
flirtation with horror and violence.28 What Bataille finds in these photographs, however, 
is not anecdotal evidence of the limits of human depravity or a spectacle for sadistic 
entertainment. Instead, Bataille explains, “I loved him with a love in which the sadistic 
instinct had no part: he communicated his pain to me or rather the excess of his pain, and 
it was precisely this that I was seeking, not to enjoy it, but to ruin in me that which is 
opposed to ruin” (122, emphasis added). Bataille finds in this sensory meditation a way 
of breaking down the habits of relaxation, both discursive and non-discursive, by which 
we turn away from the ecstatic “hour of truth:”  
When an image of torture falls before my eyes, I can, in my fear, turn 
away. But if I look at it, I am outside myself…the sight—horrible—of 
                                                
27 Bataille does have his own writings on the crucifixion and on the stigmata. See 
MacKendrick, “Sharing God’s Wounds: Laceration, Communication, and Stigmata” in 
The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Contact and Communication (Albany: SUNY UP, 
2009).  
 
28 Hollywood devotes a large portion of her book defending Bataille’s meditative practice 
before these photographs. Whereas some readers understand it as an a-historical 
voyeurism by which Bataille finds pleasure in the suffering of this Other, Hollywood 
insists that Bataille is instead responding to the specifies of his own historical moment by 
developing a practice of witness that testifies to the pain of others without trying to place 
that pain in an economy of redemption, salvation, or morality. See Sensible Ecstasy: 
Mysiticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1992).  
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torture opens the sphere that enclosed (or limited) my personal 
particularity, it opens it violently, lacerates it (30).  
Like Angela, Bataille finds in this sensory meditation an opening for exposing 
himself to communication of the bodily truth of being. In the face of such cruelty, “it is 
natural to rebel, to cry out (the heart fails us): ‘That can no longer be!’ and to weep and 
blame some whipping post” (122). If we can find a meaning, a scapegoat, a reason for 
this suffering, we can restore a sense of order and normalcy to the world, and turn away 
from the fulgurating truth of nonknowledge; by refusing to turn away from the 
photograph, however, Bataille can “only love him, right to the dregs and without hope” 
(ibid.)  
In viewing photographs and videos of other people’s suffering, one often feels the 
hair stand up on the back of the neck, the stomach twist into knots, and sometimes even 
waves of nausea. Bataille’s practice involves surrendering to these convulsions rather 
than closing one’s eyes or turning to reassuring ideas of justice, meaning, or salvation. 
When Bataille speaks of stretching the laceration he feels before the image of torture, he 
means attending to these bodily convulsions, allowing them to break down his sense of 
being discrete from the other, of being separated and protected from his pain. The body in 
pain becomes a site of communication; just as eroticism can turn two or more bodies into 
a site for the communication of pleasure, the meditation on images of torture creates a 
kind of secular stigmata, an occurrence not of the transmission of pain from one body to 
another, but of two bodies joined in a community of pain.  
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In other words, the evasive response is a flight from the bodily into the conceptual 
or a refusal of the bodily communication of suffering by turning away, sheltering the 
body rather than exposing it; unable to bear the communication of the pain, we retreat 
into explanation. Bataille’s method returns us to our bodily exposure, to the body as a site 
of communication. In this practice, the contestation we saw in the previous section 
becomes bodily rather than intellectual; Bataille’s meditative practice contests discourse 
with bodily experience rather than discursive argumentation.  
Through all of these instances of ecstatic communication—eroticism, laughter, 
and stigmatic meditation—Bataille thinks the body not as an object or as an “embodied” 
subject, but rather as a site, an opening for encountering the uncanny dimension of being 
and experience that eludes the calculations of reason and the closure of the concept. Like 
Heidegger’s thinking of earth and poetry, Bataille’s ecstatic body offers a way to think 
the body as a site of exposure, a being-open-to that which gives experience its richness 
and irreducibility to concepts or projects.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
The body is the being-exposed of being… 
The body is the self in departure. 
-Jean-Luc Nancy 
 
 While writing this essay, I often found myself in a particular conundrum Judith 
Butler describes in the opening of Bodies That Matter:  
I tried to discipline myself to stay on the subject, but found that I could not 
fix bodies as simple objects of thought. Not only did bodies tend to 
indicate a world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond their own 
boundaries, a movement of boundary itself, appeared to be quite central to 
what bodies "are." I kept losing track of the subject. I proved resistant to 
discipline. Inevitably, I began to consider that perhaps this resistance to 
fixing the subject was essential to the matter at hand (ix). 
I quickly came to realize that if a body, or a bodily experience, is not to be the 
quantifiable body of science or simply an extension of metaphysical subjectivity, then 
this slippage, this constant withdrawal from conceptual fixity must be affirmed rather 
than denied, embraced rather than mitigated. In both Heidegger’s poetizing and Bataille’s 
ecstasy, we have found openings for thinking the body as a site for an encounter with that 
which exceeds rational calculability and metaphysical objectification, finding instead a 
reminder of our exposure and finitude as beings rather than our self-enclosure and 
infinity as sovereign subjects. 
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 Like the body itself, however, the implications for such a rethinking of the body, 
if taken seriously, slip past the boundaries of simple philosophical explanation. The 
bodily dimension of experience I have pursued here is not an “object” of study about 
which one can speak or write without affecting that speaking or writing itself. 
 In Heidegger’s engagement with poetry, we find not only a philosophical 
explication of poetry, but an entangling of philosophy with poetry. Heidegger’s own 
thought becomes increasingly poetic, not only in its concern but in its execution. The 
unpublished writings of the 1930s and 1940s are not fragmentary because they are 
incomplete, but rather because they take seriously the claims they make. Heidegger not 
only thinks exposure as an “existential” category, but incorporates this thought of 
exposure into his own writing. The aphoristic, poetic language of The Event and 
Contributions to Philosophy, for example, transform thought rather than simply 
redressing the same metaphysics in a more alluring cloth. “Language and the human 
being determine each other reciprocally,” Heidegger says near the end of Contributions; 
indeed, Heidegger is one of those rare thinkers who takes this seriously (393).     
 This is to say that Heidegger’s thinking of poetry does not simply change the way 
we read and think about poetry, but requires a fundamental shift in how we philosophize, 
how we write, how we think, indeed, how we live. We can no longer ignore the 
attunements within which we find ourselves and out of which we philosophize. I wonder 
whether or not Heidegger’s country walks were an attempt to awaken himself to quiet the 
quotidian concerns of everydayness and to be able to hear attunement; perhaps it was a 
form of thinking with his feet.   
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 In Bataille, this call to transformation is even more explicit. By incorporating 
meditative practices into the heart of his oeuvre, the Summa Atheologica, Bataille boldly 
embraces his own claim that his texts are not meant for those read to acquire knowledge, 
but those who would be part of a new community founded not on a common feature, but 
a bodily experience of dispossession. Bataille’s own writing not only speaks of 
communication, but themselves are an attempt at communicating, an attempt to let 
silence break forth within discourse itself. 
 I must admit, there is no small share of disingenuousness in my invoking this idea 
of a transformation of philosophy in the conclusion of a standard philosophical essay; I 
am certainly not a writer or thinker of the caliber of either of the men I have been dealing 
with here. Nevertheless, I will leave the reader with this: if a philosopher is to be more 
than bureaucrat, more than an auditor of arguments or an archivist of concepts, then 
perhaps what is needed is a willingness to let philosophy transform itself, to engage 
questions that expose us rather than reassure us. The question of the bodily—the most 
difficult, according to Heidegger—may be a good place to start.  
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
Heidegger 
BT Being & Time 
CP Contributions to Philosophy: of the Event 
E The Event 
ET “On the Essence of Truth” (in Basic Writings) 
FCM Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude 
GA1 Frühe Schriften (Gesamtausgabe Bd. 1)  
HH Hölderlin’s Hymns: Germania and the Rhine 
OWA “The Origin of the Work of Art” (in Basic Writings) 
WM  “What is Metaphysics?” (in Basic Writings)  
 
Bataille 
AS The Accursed Share, Vol. 1: Consumption 
ASII The Acursed Share, Vol. 2: The History of Eroticism 
ASIII The Acursed Share, Vol. 3: Sovereignty 
CH The Crade of Humanity: Prehistoric Art and Culture 
EDS Erotism: Death and Sensuality 
G Guilty 
IE Inner Experience 
ON On Nietzsche 
USN The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge 
VE Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939 
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